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i. ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the value of Marine Harvest ASA per December 17, 
2015. The analysis was performed by using fundamental and relative 
valuation approaches and the assumptions made in the analysis was made 
on the basis on throughout analyses of the macro, industry and firm-specific 
drivers of value in the salmon farming industry. The share price was derived 
exploring six key factors affecting the cash flows, risk and financial structure 
of MHG. First, the strategic analysis finds that economic conditions are 
favorable for the export of Norwegian salmon, but that opportunities for 
organic growth are limited because of health- and environmental issues and 
the strictly regulated access to licenses. The industry has consolidated 
largely and this is likely to be the main driver of growth for MHG. Second, I 
find that operational margins have been persistently stable, and hence I 
conclude that historical margins will also be applicable for the forecast 
period. Third, the salmon prices are expected to increase slightly from the 
current levels while feed cost is expected to decrease due to MHG’s 
upstream integrations into feed production. MHG’s harvest volumes are 
expected to increase in line with historical growth consolidation and 
limitations of licenses taken into account. Fourth, the income growth from the 
VAP market is predicted remain strong, much due to the acquisition of 
Morpol in 2013. Fifth, the cost of capital is expected to remain relatively low 
as a result of historically low interest rates in the Norwegian economy that is 
expected to persist. The risk associated with an investment in MHG is 
moderate, considering MHG’s strong financial position and that the food 
industry is less volatile than the overall market. Last, the fundamental 
valuation suggests that the fair share price of MHG is NOK 125, which is also 
supported by the relative valuation. Hence I conclude that MHG is slightly 
undervalued at the current trading price, and a buy recommendation is 
appropriate. 
 
Key words: valuation, salmon farming, aquaculture, discounted cashflow 
analysis 
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iii. PREFACE 
 
With this thesis I complete my Master of Science in Economics & Business 
Administration at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). My major is 
Financial Economics and with this thesis I comprise theory from a variety of 
courses I have undertaken.  
 
In the course of my master degree I have completed courses in corporate 
finance, investments and valuation, which has given me a sound theoretical 
foundation and an understanding of methodology to conduct a valuation. 
However, I have experienced the importance of the strategy courses I have 
completed, as the strategic analysis is critical to forecast the cashflows and 
growth rates which are ultimately the core drivers of value.  
 
The aquaculture is daily exposed in the media because of the increased 
focus on aquacultures’ importance in feeding a growing population. As the 
currency exchange rate has been dropping heavily the past months, the 
conditions for export of aquaculture products has been very beneficial. With 
this thesis, I wanted to determine whether the financial markets have indeed 
fully valued the potential upside of the company that is the global leader in a 
sector that very well might be one of Norway’s strongest assets in the years 
to come. The experience I have gained during my work with this thesis has 
been a challenging yet rewarding exercise.  
 
I wish to state my gratitude towards my supervising professor Frode Sættem, 
who has given me valuable feedback and advice throughout the process. 
His presence and involvement has been critical, enabling me to remain 
focused in my work and maintain confident in my analyses. He has always 
been welcoming and willing to share his knowledge. 
 
Bergen, December 21, 2015 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
APV – Adjusted Present Value 
CAGR – Compounded Annual Growth Rate  
Capex – Capital expenditures  
CAPM – Capital Asset Pricing Model 
DCF – Discounted cash flow 
DDM – Dividend Discount Model 
EBIT – Earning Before Interest and Taxes  
EBITDA – Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
FCFE – Free Cash Flow to Equity 
FCFF – Free Cash Flow to Firm 
GWE – Gutted fish (84% of total weight) 
LW – Live weight (100% of total weight) 
MAB – Maximum Allowed Biomass  
MHG – Marine Harvest ASA 
MHG.OL – Ticker Marine Harvest Oslo Stock Exchange 
OSEBX – Oslo Stock Exchange benchmark index  
VAP – Value-Added Processing  
WACC – Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
WFE – Harvested weight (93% of total weight) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The continual increasing population on earth will offset a greater demand for 
protein in the future. The supply of land-based animalistic protein is already 
scarce because of competition for water, available land, feed and energy. 
Protein from aquaculture is therefore believed to constitute a significant role 
in feeding the growing population of the world1.  
 
“Aquaculture can potentially increase to meet the protein needs of 500 
million more people by 2050 [...] by 2050 there will be an additional three 
billion middle class people with spending power to be selective in their food 
purchasing.”  
Dr. Fraser Thomson, McKinsey Institute 
 
The increased spending power has been showed to make major impact on 
people’s choice of food, both concerning environmental- and nutritional 
issues. People typically consume food with increased nutritional value and 
that is more environmentally sound with rising spending power. Salmon 
contains high levels of vitamins, minerals and omega-tree acids in addition to 
being more environmental friendly than many other sources of animalistic 
protein.      
 
Aquaculture is Norway’s largest industry after the oil and gas industry. Last 
week the price per barrel of North Sea oil dropped to its lowest level since 
the financial crisis in 2009, which has had a huge impact on the 
unemployment rates and exchange rates in Norway. The Norwegian krone is 
now trading at its lowest level since the mid 1980’s compared to several of 
the major currencies. Nevertheless, development in the exchange rate has 
left the aquaculture industry in a unique position where import of Norwegian 
aquaculture products has become relatively more attractive. The exported 
volumes of salmon have been record high in 2015 and there is broad 
consensus among leading Norwegian analysts that the exchange rate is not 
going to strengthen in the near future. Marine Harvest Group ASA (MHG) is 
the leading producer of salmon in the world, with their largest production 
                                            
1 According to Dr. Fraser Thomson formerly of the McKinsey Institute at the AquaVision 
conference in Stavanger 2012   
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volumes in Norway. Therefore, the development in the currency exchange 
rate indicates favorable future prospects for the export of Norwegian salmon.  
 
In the backdrop of the above I will in this thesis shed light on key drivers of 
the salmon farming industry to retrieve MHG true value. The drivers 
presented above are specific for the economic development today. However, 
the salmon farming industry is affected by other drivers specific for the 
salmon farming industry.  
  
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 present the 
overall industry and MHG. Section 3 and 4 describes methodology for 
different valuation methods and draw conclusion on the best method to use 
for MHG. Section 5, 6 and 7 presents the macro, industry and firm analysis 
respectively. Section 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 reviews historical accounting figures 
and present estimates for the forecasting period. Section 13, 14, 15 and 16 
presents the discount rate and the the results from the valuation with 
corresponding sensitivity analysis. 
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2. PRESENTATION OF MARINE HARVEST AND THE INDUSTRY  
 
This chapter will present Marine Harvest and elaborate on important aspects 
of the salmon farming industry that will serve as a sound basis for further 
analysis.  
 
2.1 MARINE HARVEST  
Marine Harvest is the leading producer of Atlantic Salmon in the world and is 
one of the world’s largest seafood companies. The company, as we know it 
today, is a result of the merger between Pan Fish, Fjord Seafoods and Marine 
Harvest N.V. in 2006. Since then, Marine Harvest has grown in several of its 
services. The company established its own feed manufacturing plant in 
Bjugn in 2012 and are now ~80% self-sufficient of feed supply in Norway. In 
addition, the processing division has grown with the acquisition of Morpol in 
2013 and the farming division has grown with the merger with AquaChile in 
2014.   
 
MHG’s long-term strategy, under the parole “Leading the Blue Revolution”, is 
to become a leading protein producer with a fully integrated value chain. 
Both the acquisition of Morpol and the development of the feed plant in 
Bjugn have strengthened the company’s efforts of becoming a fully 
integrated company in the entire value chain of fish farming.   
 
Table 1 shows MHG’s national and international scope, where MHG is the 
largest single player in all regions producing salmon except Canada. The 
accumulated market shares of the largest companies also comprise a 
significant share of the total market. MHG’s global market share is in the 
range of 25-30%, which is likely to increase as a result of the acquisition of 
AquaChile. However, high mortality rates have long been a severe issue in 
Chilean salmon farming, and these unfavorable conditions are expected to 
continue for at least 2 more years. After that it is assumed that the volumes 
will pick up in 2018 because that is when the new production cycle of 
Chilean salmon is ready to be harvested. The anticipated harvest volumes for 
2015 is 430,000 tons, which is an increase of 2.7% from 2014 (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015).    
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Norway' Harv' UK' Harv' Canada' Harv' Chile'' Harv'
MHG$ $258$$ MHG$ $49$$ Cooke$ $34$$ MHG$ $68$$
Salmar$$ $141$$ Scottish$Salmon$ $30$$ MHG$ $27$$ Salmones$$ $54$$
Lerøy$ $133$$ Scottish$Seafarms$ $28$$ Cermaq$ $19$$ AquaChile$ $52$$
Cermaq$ $53$$ Grieg$$ $19$$ Northern$Harvest$ $15$$ Cermaq$ $49$$
Nordlaks$ $39$$ Cooke$$ $17$$ Grieg$ $6$$ Pesquera$ $47$$
Nova$Sea$ $38$$ $$ $$ $$ $$ Camanchaca$ $35$$
Grieg$ $38$$ $$ $$ $$ $$ Blumar$ $35$$
AlsakerRoyal$ $26$$ $$ $$ $$ $$ Australis$ $26$$
NRS$ $23$$ $$ $$ $$ $$ Humboldt$ $20$$
SinkabergMHansen$ $21$$ $$ $$ $$ $$ Cooke$$ $18$$
Total$top$10$ $768$$ Total$top$5$ $143$$ Total$top$5$ $101$$ Total$top$10$ $403$$
Market$size$$ 1079$$ Market$size$$ $154$$ Market$size$$ $109$$ Market$size$$ $525$$
Market$share$top$10$ 71$%$ Market$share$top$5$ 93$%$ Market$share$top$5$ 92$%$ Market$share$top$10$ 77$%$
Table 1: MHG is the largest player in all regions producing salmon except Canada (ibid).  
 
In addition to operations in the countries presented in figure 1, MHG has 
operations in Ireland and on the Faroes, and their products are sold to 23 
countries. In 2014 the total turnover was NOK ~25B, an all-time high revenue, 
resulting from both high prices for salmon and record high harvest volumes. 
They are currently employing 11,715 people, where the largest workforce are 
employed in their processing plants in Europe (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
Figure 1 exhibits the historical share price development of MHG since 2006, 
which has been very volatile. Currently the price is NOK 116.30 and their 
volume 450,086 million shares outstanding, which makes their total market 
capitalization ~52.345 billon at December 17, 2015 (Bloomberg, 2015).   
 
 
Figure 1: MHG’s share price has increased significantly since 2012 (Yahoo , 2015) 
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2.2 THE SALMON FARMING INDUSTRY  
Salmon derives from the family Salmonidae, which included several species 
of salmon and trout, among them Atlantic salmon, Pacific salmon, brown trout 
and seawater trout. Most of these species are available from both wild and 
farmed sources, however the majority of commercially available Atlantic 
salmon is farmed (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). Figure 2 exhibit an overview 
over the harvested volumes of different Salmonidae species in 2014, which 
show that the harvest of Atlantic salmon is considerably higher than other 
species in the family.   
 
 
Figure 2: Harvested volumes of Atlantic salmon is considerably higher than volumes of other 
Salmonidae species (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015) 
 
Salmon farming first became an industry in Norway in the 1980s after being 
on a relatively experimental level since the 1960s. The industry later came to 
Chile in the 1990s (GSI, 2011). Since then the salmon farming industry has 
grown substantially and today around 70% of the global supply of salmon is 
farmed (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).    
 
Today, Salmonidae species contribute to 4.2% of the global seafood supply 
(Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). Further, salmon and other sources of protein 
from the ocean comprise 17% of the total animalistic protein sources for 
human consumption (FAO, 2015). The supply of fish protein is relatively low 
0
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compared to land-based protein considering that 70% of the world’s surface 
is covered by water. 
 
Nevertheless, the UN expects the population to reach 9.7 billion by 2050, 
and expects that the demand for protein will double from current levels. The 
UN also forecast that the fisheries and aquaculture is going to play a 
significant role in feeding the growing population as increase in supply of 
land-based protein will be low. Currently, protein supply from aquaculture is 
outpacing population growth. In addition, continuous encouragement from 
governments to eat healthy food is expected to increase the consumption of 
fish (FAO, 2014). Salmon has a high content of omega-3 and protein in 
addition to being a good source of minerals and vitamins. 
 
The trend per capita in fish consumption is diverse across regions. Today, 
~170 million tons live weight (LW) of aquaculture is available for human 
consumption, which has almost doubled since 2000. China is the largest 
single market comprising 62% of the global aquaculture market and the 
accumulated share in Asia is 88% (FAO, 2014). OECD and FAO estimates 
that the growth in aquaculture production of fish in Asia will continue to be 
high and especially in China and India were growth in supply of fish is 
predicted to be higher than 25% in the period between 2015 and 2024. The 
growth is also estimated to stay high in regions producing salmon; both 
Norway, Chile and Canada are estimated to see growth rates in production of 
fish from aquaculture over 25% between 2015 and 2024 (OECD/FAO, 2015). 
Farmed salmon is one of Norway’s most important export commodities and 
with the gradually withdraw from extraction of oil, the industry’s importance is 
likely to be greatly enhanced.    
 
2.3 THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR SALMON 
2.3.1 Historical Production Levels and Prognosis  
Between 1994 and 2014 the supply of salmon has increased by 428%, which 
corresponds to an annual growth of 9%. However, the growth has diminished 
in recent years, as the annual growth rate dropped to 6% p.a. between 2004 
and 2014 and is predicted to decline to 3% to 2020 by Kontali Analyse. The 
reason for the expected decline is that the industry has reach a biological 
roof, where further increases in production capacity can offset lice problems 
and diseases, thus increase mortality of salmon and environmental damages. 
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The industry therefore requires progress in technology, pharmaceutical 
products and innovation in other non-pharmaceutical techniques to cope 
with increased salmon farming capacity (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
Only a few coastlines are available for salmon farming, because of climate 
and biological constraints. A prerequisite for optimal salmon production is 
water temperatures ranging from 8 to 14 °C. In addition, salmon farming also 
requires a certain degree of current to secure circulation of water in the net 
cages. However, the current must be weak enough to enable salmon to 
move freely in the cages. Last, licenses are required for harvesting salmon, 
which can limit the output a company wish to achieve. The main regions 
producing salmon today are Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands, UK, North 
America and Chile. The estimated production volumes for each region is 
displayed in figure 3 (ibid).  
 
 
 
Figure 3: The production volume in Norway is significantly higher than in other regions (ibid)  
2.3.2 Trade and Flow of Goods   
Salmon is a commodity that is traded globally. Figure 4 gives an overview of 
the trade and flow of salmon products in the global market. The regions 
producing salmon are marked by “harvest” and the regions buying salmon is 
marked by “market”. Traditionally, each region producing salmon has 
supplied regions nearby, as illustrated in figure 4. Norway’s largest markets 
are the EU, Russia and Asia, Chile’s main markets is USA, South America 
and Asia, Canada’s main market is USA, while Scotland has mainly supplied 
its domestic market (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). 
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Figure 4: Export of salmon is mostly supplied to nearby markets (ibid)  
 
The reason for supplying nearby markets has its origin in salmon being a 
fresh commodity and that it is sensitive to time usage and cost related to 
transportation. Using transatlantic suppliers requires air transport, which 
means that the price differential has to be significant in order to justify the 
increased cost of the trade. Price differentials varies and occur as a result of 
mismatch between supply and demand of salmon in the market. An issue 
threatening the traditional trade patterns is the supply of frozen salmon, 
especially from Chile to the European market. Still, the frozen category is 
diminishing and the traditional trade pattern is therefore expected to sustain 
(ibid).    
2.3.3 Price formation 
The price of salmon is to a large extent determined on the basis of the 
preferences of the customers concerning price and quality. The production 
cycle of salmon is between two to three years and the volumes are therefore 
subject to minimal adjustments once the production cycle has been initiated, 
hence the volume is inelastic in the short-term. In addition, the salmons’ short 
shelf life means that the salmons have to be supplied and consumed in the 
same period. Both the inelastic short-term supply and the short shelf life 
make salmon farmers price takers in the short-term market, because the 
supply cannot be increased on short-term notice and that salmon cannot be 
storage for a long time. However, salmon can be frozen which will increase 
its shelf life and harvest can be postponed or advanced to some degree, 
North&America:
Harvest:&109&000
Market:&419&000
Norway,&Iceland,&
Faroe&Islands:
Harvest:&1&157&000
Market:&891&000
Latin&America:
Harvest:&525&000
Market:&145&000
Russia:
Harvest:&12&000
Market:&131&000
Japan:
Harvest:&0
Market:&58&000
EU:
Harvest:&167&000
Market:&891&000
Other&Asia:
Harvest:&0
Market:&179&000
Australia&and&New&
Zealand:
Harvest:&35&000
Market:&43&000
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enabling sale when market conditions are more favorable (Marine Harvest 
ASA, 2015).   
2.3.4 Industry Structure  
Continual consolidations have characterized the industry in recent years and 
is expected to continue going forward. In Norway the number of companies 
in the industry producing 80% of the farmed salmon has decreased from 70 
in 1997 to 23 in 2014. Similar figures for Chile, Scotland and Canada is from 
34 to 13, 11 to 4 and 9 to 4 respectively. The reason for the higher 
fragmentation of companies in Norway has its origin in the policies of the 
Norwegian government, which priorities decentralized structures and local 
ownership. Opposite, Chile has less policies on structures, which is a mean 
to grow the industry faster (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).   
2.3.5 Production of Salmon 
As mentioned in a previous section, the production cycle for salmon is 
between two and three years and the process is thoroughly depicted in 
figure 5. During the first year the eggs are fertilized, which takes 
approximately 60 days. The subsequent step is spawning, where the 
fertilized eggs are transferred to a hatchery and put into a controlled 
freshwater environment where the fish grows to approximately 100 grams. 
The spawning process requires two tanks of different size and the hatched 
fish is moved to the larger tank as the fish grows to fry. After the spawning 
process, the fish is transported to net cages in seawater for a period of 14-24 
months, during which the fish gains a bodyweight of approximately 4-5 kg. 
The growth in bodyweight is strictly determined by water temperatures, 
which vary by season and regions. Last, the salmon is harvested before it is 
slaughtered and gutted at a primary processing plant. The production cycle 
in Chile is slightly faster as Chile has more optimal sea temperatures for 
salmon farming (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).   
 
Producers in Norway release smolt into seawater two times a year. Harvested 
volumes are spread relatively even throughout the year; largest in the last 
quarter of the year as sea temperatures provide the best growth in this 
period and lowest in the summer due to harvesting pattern shifts generation. 
After the fish has been harvested from a site, the site has to be fallowed for 
between 2 and 6 months (ibid).  
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Figure 5: The production of salmon is a six step process from spawning to processing (ibid) 
2.3.5 Cost Dynamics  
Table 2 is an overview of the operational cost per kg GWE in the different 
regions MHG is operating for 2014, where feed cost is clearly the most 
significant, constituting 60% of COGS. The following paragraphs will 
elaborate on the most significant operational cost and what drives them.   
 
$$ Norway$(NOK)$ Canada$(CAD)$ Scotland$(GBP)$ Chile$(USD)$
Feed$ 12.35$ 2.26$ 1.62$ 2.08$
Primary$processing$$ 2.62$ 0.55$ 0.31$ 0.41$
Smolt$$ 2.28$ 0.54$ 0.31$ 0.48$
Salary$ 1.49$ 0.56$ 0.18$ 0.15$
Maintenance$ 0.89$ 0.22$ 0.09$ 0.19$
Well$boat$$ 0.98$ 0.21$ 0.21$ 0.28$
Depreciation$ 0.76$ 0.2$ 0.13$ 0.13$
Sales$&$Marketing$$ 0.62$ 0.02$ 0.04$ 0.01$
Mortality$ 0.34$ 0.04$ 0.15$ 0.02$
Other$ 3.34$ 1.14$ 0.25$ 0.77$
Total$ 25.67$ 5.74$ 3.29$ 4.52$
Table 2: Feed comprise the largest part of the operational cost of producing salmon (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015) 
 
2.3.5.1 Feed cost  
As mentioned feed cost is the most significant operational cost, and variation 
in the feed cost largely depends on input prices for commodities used in 
feed production, transportation cost and the feed conversion ratio. The feed 
conversion ratio is the amount of feed in kilos needed for the salmon to put 
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on 1 kilo of bodyweight, which is currently a ratio of 1.1. The feed conversion 
ratio largely depend on the age of the salmon, were younger fish typically 
has a lower feed conversion ratio than older fish (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
2.3.5.2 Eggs 
The production of fish eggs is international and dominated by four suppliers; 
Aquagen AS, Fanas Fisheries Ltd, Lakeland and Salmobreed AS. The supply 
of fish eggs is more elastic than the harvested volumes as the breeding of 
fish for egg production takes place the season before the eggs are put into 
fresh water. The salmon farming companies therefore has some flexibility to 
adjust their demand for eggs to the expected demand for salmon (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015).   
2.3.5.3 Smolt 
The smolt production is vertically integrated by most salmon farming 
companies. The production takes place in either lakes or land-based plants, 
where the latter is more capital expensive because of the equipment and the 
replacement of water required in the operation. In addition, there has been 
an increasing trend of growing the smolt to 100-1000 grams (compared to 
the norm of 60-100 grams) in order to decrease the time and cost at sea. The 
UK has relatively high cost of smolt because of low scale production. Chile, 
on the other hand, has relatively low cost because of using lake-based 
production and enjoy low labor cost (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
2.3.5.4 Salary Costs  
Norway has the highest level of automation among the countries producing 
salmon, which partially offsets that Norway also has the highest wage levels. 
Chile is the complete opposite, with the lowest level of automation in the 
industry yet the lowest wage levels. The wage- and automation levels will 
drive the salary cost in the opposite direction, still the total salary cost in 
Chile is slightly lower than in Norway (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).     
2.3.5.5 Electricity  
The energy cost is largest during the earliest and latest stage of a salmon’s 
life cycle. During the smoltification the energy cost is highest for land based 
plants as the temperatures in the tanks have to be regulated. The energy 
cost is the highest when temperatures are low and comprise 4-5% of the 
smolt cost in Norway. The size of the smolt also drives the cost, as larger 
smolt has longer production cycles in the plant. Processing carried out after 
the salmon is harvested also require energy and is highly depends on the 
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level of automation. The energy cost of processing comprise approximately 
2-3% of total harvest cost in Norway. The cost also largely depends on the 
energy prices in the region (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).     
2.3.5.6 Mortality 
The mortality expense is relatively low in 2014, but has been considerably 
higher earlier, for instance when the Panacea Disease broke out in Chile in 
2008/2009. Mortality can be affected by temperatures, as high temperatures 
increase the risk of disease, which again can lead to high mortality rates. 
Low temperatures will on the other hand directly increase the risk of mortality. 
Temperatures vary more in the Northern regions and are the most stable in 
Chile, which gives the region a competitive advantage (Marine Harvest ASA, 
2015). 
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3. VALUATION MODELS  
In the previous section I elaborated on the mechanisms of salmon farming to 
give the necessary backdrop to conduct the proper valuation of MHG. This 
chapter will present different valuation approaches describing the 
methodology for each approach and where the approach is most suitable, 
that will provide a basis for the choice of valuation method for MHG.  
   
According to Damodaran of Stern Business School at New York University 
there are three approaches to valuation in general terms; discounted cash 
flow valuation (DCF)2, relative valuation and contingent claim valuation. The 
first approach calculates the value of an asset using the future expected 
cash flows generated by that asset. The second approach uses prices of 
comparable companies relative to a common variable to estimate the value 
of an asset. The third approach uses option pricing models to value an asset 
(Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 2012). In the following chapters each 
approach will in turn be elaborated.   
 
3.1 FUNDAMENTAL VALUATION 
The underlying theme in fundamental analysis is that a firm’s true value can 
be computed based on its financial characteristics, i.e., the firm’s growth 
prospects, risk profile and its cashflows. Deviations from the value derived in 
the fundamental analysis imply that the stock is incorrectly priced by the 
market. It can be argued that the fundamental valuation constitutes the 
foundation on which all other valuation approaches are built. The 
fundamentals in a discounted cashflow model has to be understood in order 
to conduct a relative valuation and one often have to begin with a cash flow 
analysis to conduct an option pricing valuation (Damodaran, Investment 
Valuation, 2012).  
 
There are three variations of the discounted cash flow valuation; (i) value the 
equity stake in the firm, (ii) value the stake of all claimholders in the firm and 
(iii) value the firm in pieces. The latter begins with valuing operations and 
then adding the effects of debt and equity (ibid).   
 
                                            
2 DCF methods refers to all valuation approaches which include discounting future cash 
flows, i.e. WACC-, FTE- and APV approaches.   
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In some cases, the discounted cashflow model is less applicable to value the 
stock of a company. For distressed firms with negative earnings and 
cashflow, the model will yield a negative value of equity for the firm even 
though the firm will survive. The model can also be less applicable for highly 
cyclical firms as they can look troubled during a recession and analyst 
estimates for economic outlook is highly biased. Since the DCF model base 
its valuation on the cash flow generated by assets, the value can be 
underestimated if the firm has a lot of unutilized assets. The same applies for 
firms with patents or product options. The DCF model can also be less 
suitable for firms in the process of restructuring, as major changes in 
investment and financing policies affects the riskiness of the firm. The same 
applies for firms involved in acquisitions, where the change in management 
affect the riskiness of a firm in a hostile takeover. Also, the estimation of the 
potential synergies which affects the cashflow can have implications for the 
accuracy of the model. Last, the model is more difficult to apply for private 
firms as it can be hard to obtain an appropriate risk parameter because of 
the lacking data of historical prices (ibid).  
 
Another factor which has to be considered when doing a fundamental 
analysis is the life cycle of the firm. The phase in the life cycle the firm is in 
determines whether a one-stage, two-stage or three-stage growth model 
should be used. The three different approaches use one, two and three 
growth rates respectively to value the firm. Young firms typically experience 
rapid growth, which declines when the firm becomes more mature and then 
stabilize at a long term growth, hence a three-stage model should be used. 
For mature firms a two-stage model is typically used and for firms that are in 
the stability phase a one-stage model is sufficient (ibid).   
3.1.1 Flow-to-equity Method (FTE) 
The flow-to-equity method uses the cashflow available to equity holders 
discounted at the cost of equity to value the firm, as showed in equation 1. 
The free cash flow to equity (FCFE) is the free cash flow that remains after 
adjusting for interest payments, debt issuance and debt repayment. The cost 
of equity is the return required by equity investors in the firm (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2014).   
 
!"#$%&'(&)*$+,- = & /0&,'&)*$+,-11 + 45 1167168  
Equation 1: Value of equity 
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.     
 
The dividend discount model is a specialized case of equity valuation, where 
the value of the equity is the present value of expected future dividends, 
which is presented in section 3.1.3. 
 
The disadvantage with the FTE approach is that it requires stable debt levels, 
as the risk, and hence the cost of equity, increases (decreases) with 
increasing (decreasing) levels of debt. Another disadvantage is that the debt 
capacity has to be determined in order to compute interest rates and net 
borrowing to retrieve the free cash flow available to equity holders. For this 
reason, the WACC method is often easier to apply. However, in cases where 
the company structures of the firm are complex the FTE approach can offer 
an advantage to the WACC and APV approach as the equity value is 
computed directly. In contrast the WACC and APV approach compute the 
enterprise value and has to adjust for other components in the capital 
structure. In addition, the FTE method is deemed as a more transparent 
method for estimating the benefit to shareholders (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014).     
3.1.2 The Weighted Average Cost of Capital Method (WACC-method)  
The WACC method uses the cash flows to all stakeholders discounted by the 
WACC to value the firm, seen in equation 2. The free cash flow available to 
the firm is the after-tax EBIT plus depreciation, and less change in net 
working capital and capital expenditures. The WACC is the after-tax cost of 
capital, which is the cost of the different financing components of the firm, 
weighted by their marked value proportions. WACC incorporates the benefit 
of tax shields by using the firm’s after-tax cost of debt (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2014). The calculation of WACC will be further elaborated on in section 12.1. 
 
!"#$%&'(&0+9: = & /0&,'&0+9:11 +;<// 1167168  
Equation 2: Value of levered firm 
The WACC method is frequently used as it is simple and straight forward. In 
addition to the FTE approach the WACC method also requires stable debt 
levels and the model (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). Further Damodaran assigns 
two additional problems with the WACC model. One is that the free cash flow 
to equity is a more intuitive model. The second is that using firm cash flow 
can result in ignorance of firms with problems of survival. On the other hand, 
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the model is beneficial when the leverage of a firm is expected to change 
significantly over time, as the cash flow related to debt is not considered 
(Damodaran, FCFF Valuation Models , 2005).  
3.1.3 Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
The dividend discount model is the simples of the equity valuation models, 
where the value of the stock is the present value of the expected future 
dividends, given by equation 3:  
 
!"#$%&=%9&>ℎ"9%&'(&>,'@4 = & )(BCD1)(1 + 45)116F168  
Equation 3: Dividend discount model 
Hence, the dividend discount model has a stricter definition of cash flow to 
equity than the FTE model, which is dividends on the stock and residual cash 
flow after meeting all financial obligations and investment needs respectively 
(Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 2012).  
 
Whilst the DDM is the simplest valuation model, it is also usually the least 
accurate. The dividends depend upon many factors – growth, competition, 
profitability, changes in legislation, exchange rates and general economic 
conditions which make it difficult to accurately measure future dividends 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). In addition, the value of the firm can be skewed if 
the firm are paying out less dividend than they can afford to. Also, the model 
does not incorporate other ways of returning cash to stockholders than 
dividends (Damodaran, Damodaran Online, 2007).  
3.1.4 Adjusted Present Value Model (APV) 
In the APV valuation method the levered value of the firm (VL) is calculated by 
computing the unlevered value of the firm, Vu, as if the firm had no debt and 
then adding the value of the interest tax shields, shown in equation 4. The 
interest tax shield is the benefit of borrowing as the interest cost is tax 
deducible (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014).  
 !G = !H + C!(IJ,%9%>,&K"L&Dℎ+%#M>) 
Equation 4: Levered value of the firm using the APV method 
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The value of the unlevered firm can be obtained by adjusting the current 
after-tax operating cash flow to the firm by future growth and depreciate by 
the unlevered cost of capital, given in equation 5:  
 !"#$%&'(&NJ#%O%9%M&0+9: = &0/00P 1 + Q=R − Q  
Equation 5: Value of unlevered firm 
  
Further the unlevered cost of capital can be obtained by using the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) with the unlevered beta of the asset, given in 
equation 6: 
 TR7U5V5W5X = TYRWW5711 + (1 − ,) B) 
Equation 6: Beta calculation 
  
The tax benefit associated with debt is a function of the tax rate of the firm 
and leverage, and is discounted at the cost of debt to reflect the riskiness of 
the cashflow, given in equation 7: 
 !"#$%&'(&K"L&Z%J%(+, = & (K"L&[",%)(/'>,&'(&B%\,)(B%\,)/'>,&'(&B%\, = K"L&[",% B%\, = ]YB 
Equation 7: Value of tax shield calculation 
 
The tax rate used in the calculations is the marginal tax rate of the firm and it 
is assumed to stay constant over time (ibid).   
 
Like the FTE model the APV approach requires predetermined debt levels in 
order for the interest tax shield to be calculated. The strengths of the model 
are that it allows for alternative leverage policies other than a stable debt 
ratio over time (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). In addition, the method separates 
debt into different components and allows for using different discounts rates 
for each component (Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 2012).  
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3.2 RELATIVE VALUATION 
The aim of relative valuation is to value assets by using the market prices of 
similar assets. There are two components of relative valuation. The first is to 
standardize prices in order to value assets on a relative basis, which is 
usually done by converting prices into multiples of earnings, book value or 
sales. The second to find suitable firms for peers with similar risk, growth 
potential and cash flows (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014).    
 
In a relative valuation, the value of an asset is derived from the pricing of 
‘comparable’ assets, standardized using a common variable such as 
earnings, cash flows, book value or revenue. The model assumes that the 
market, on average, prices these firms correctly, but makes individual errors 
in pricing individual stocks. Another assumption is that a multiple comparison 
will allow us to identify these errors and that they will be corrected over time. 
Commonly used multiples are price-earnings ratio, price-to-book ratio, price-
to-sales ratio and enterprise value-to-EBIT(DA) (Damodaran, Investment 
Valuation, 2012).      
 
The model is easy to manipulate and misuse, because the decision of what is 
a comparable company can be very subjective. Another problem is that it 
builds on errors concerning over and under valuation. On the other hand, a 
relative valuation can be completed with far less assumptions than a 
discounted cash flow valuation. In addition, the value derived from a relative 
valuation is more likely to yield values closer to the market price of the asset. 
Also, the model is less time consuming to use and is simpler to understand 
than a discounted cashflow valuation (ibid).  
 
These strengths can also be weaknesses of relative valuation. If the group of 
comparable firms differ in terms of risk, growth prospects and cashflows the 
value derived form a relative valuation can be over- or under estimated. The 
relative valuation is also sensitive to the market expectations of the 
comparable firms, where overly optimistic and overly pessimistic 
expectations can lead to an over- or under estimated value (ibid).  
3.2.1 Trading peer analysis  
Peer comparison is widely used approach and is often used to complement 
a comprehensive fundamental analysis, and is frequently used by both 
individual and professional analysts. The multiple analysis is often based on 
EBITDA multiples as it is unaffected by capital structure and different 
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depreciation policies across countries (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). 
The EBITDA measure is therefore a good measure as the peers differs in 
terms of leverage and has operations in different countries. The EBITDA/kilo 
is also a widely used multiple for measuring for the margins per kilo in the 
salmon farming industry. Combining the two multiples by multiplying them 
the EV/kilo multiple is obtained. The multiple measures the value of all assets 
less cash to the harvested volumes in the company in kilos. Nevertheless, the 
EV/kg multiple is sensitive to mortality caused by health issues and escapes 
caused by weather. Consequently, the EV/EBITDA multiple will be used for 
the peer analysis. 
3.2.2 Precedent transaction analysis  
This analysis targets transaction values from past M&A transactions of 
comparable companies to estimate the price of an asset, using deal 
multiples such as EV/EBIT(DA). The transaction values often embed a 
premium as the potential consolidated company will most likely benefit from 
synergies. On average, the deal premiums are in the 20-30% range, but can 
vary significantly depending on the characteristics of the company that is 
acquired (Rosenbaum, Pearl, & Perella, 2013).  
3.2.3 Sum of the Parts Analysis (SOTP) 
In a sum-of-the-parts (SOTP) valuation the different divisions are valued as 
separate units, as if the divisions were spun off or divested to another 
company. The analysis builds upon volume multiples on enterprise value 
(EV/kg) to value each different segment. The multiples are different across 
different geographical locations, and varies in the different steps of the value 
chain. As upstream and downstream business areas can have quite 
divergent characteristics, the multiples used can vary largely. The 
appropriate multiple for each division should reflect both of these aspects.  
 
3.3 CONTINGENT CLAIM VALUATION 
In some cases, the value of an asset may not be greater than the value of 
expected cash flows if the cash flows are contingent on the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of an event. The model applies for, for example, patents 
undeveloped reserves and other which can be considered a real option. The 
reason for the use of this model is that the cash flow models tend to 
understate the value of assets that provide payoffs that are contingent on the 
occurrence of an event (Damodaran, Damodaran Online, 2007).   
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The model assumes that the variance and dividend yields is constant, which 
does not conflict short-term options in a high degree, but is in conflict with 
long-term options. Real options are not traded, which has implications for 
estimation errors when measuring volatility and the underlying asset.     
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4. CHOICE OF MODEL AND METHOD  
To this stage I have explained the mechanisms of salmon farming and 
introduced the different valuation models available. This chapter will 
elaborate on the selected valuation method for MHG, which is based on the 
available information on public sources, firm specific factors, reliability of 
valuation, industry and phase in life cycle.   
 
4.1 ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
Data sources available for MHG is numerous. The information that can be 
retrieved from MHGs annual report and web pages include all information to 
complete a thorough fundamental valuation. In addition, there exist large 
amounts of publicly available information about future prices and and harvest 
volumes. Hence, a fundamental valuation should be conducted.  
 
In addition, sufficient data on precedent transactions in the salmon farming 
industry, and data from peers are available to conduct different multiple 
analyses. Therefore, a multiple analysis should be performed to support the 
results retrieved in the fundamental analysis.     
 
4.2 FIRM-SPECIFIC FACTORS   
MHG has had positive, relatively stable earnings historically and they are 
utilizing all their assets, which suggest using fundamental valuation. Further, 
WACC-based models works best when a company has a relatively stable 
debt-to-value ratio (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). MHG’s historical 
debt levels has been relatively stable varying around 21% to 29%, and it is 
reasonable to assume that the current debt ratio is going to remain relatively 
stable going forward as MHG is predicted to lead the consolidation trend in 
the industry which will require funding. In addition, the financial structure of 
MHG is relatively transparent, which suggest that a WACC approach is the 
most appropriate for valuation.  
 
However, the fundamental valuation should be supported by a relative 
valuation as MHG is expected to lead the consolidation trend in the industry, 
which may affect the risk and cashflows of the firm. In the multiple analysis, 
both a SOTP analysis, peer analysis and precedent transactions analysis will 
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be conducted. The sum of the parts analysis is beneficial for MHG as they 
operate within feed production, salmon farming and salmon processing. 
Hence, conducting a sum of the parts analysis will indicate whether all their 
operations are profitable. A peer analysis is beneficial because it will give 
insight on whether MHG is trading on a premium/discount relative to its 
peers, to support a trading recommendation formed on the basis of the 
fundamental analysis. The precedent transaction analysis will not be 
emphasized in the same degree as the peer analysis and SOTP analysis in 
drawing a conclusion about MHG’s price. This is because MHG is in a 
unique position as being the undisputed largest player in the industry, and 
are therefore likely to trade at a market leader premium. Smaller companies 
will be acquired at a discount compared to MHG’s trading multiples. Another 
issue, is that acquisitions often imply high premiums that are higher than the 
true market value of the target, however I believe MHG’s size and market 
leader premium will overshadow the transaction premiums found in the 
precedent transaction analysis. In addition, the salmon farming industry is in 
a high cycle far larger than what was found when the majority of these deals 
were completed, as will be discussed in section 14.3. Hence, the precedent 
transaction analysis is likely to undervalue MHG’s true enterprise value.  
 
4.3 RELIABILITY   
The market based approaches assume that the market prices on the stocks 
are correct on average, but makes errors when pricing individual stocks. 
Consequently, to retrieve a reliable value by using MHG peers, a prerequisite 
is that the peers are priced correctly by the market. If the peers are 
underprized by the market the value implied for MHG will most likely 
underprice the company. The opposite is true if the peers are overpriced. 
Hence, a fundamental analysis of MHG’s cash flow should be emphasized 
more when drawing conclusions about MHG’s value. 
 
4.4 INDUSTRY 
The salmon farming industry is characterized by volatile salmon prices and 
input prices for feed. At the same time the harvest volumes may fluctuate 
widely as a result of fish health issues and license restrictions. At the same 
time the industry has seen a continual consolidation trend, which is likely to 
increase the economies of scale for the large remaining players in the 
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industry. The volatile prices and the increasing number of consolidations in 
the industry supports using a fundamental analysis.          
 
4.5 PHASE IN THE LIFE CYCLE  
The overall industry expects lower compound annual growth rates (CAGR) of 
3% on average in the forecast period, lower than the CAGR from 2004 to 
2014 of 6%. However, MHG is already the player driving the consolidation 
trend in the industry and it is therefore no reason to expect MHG’s income 
growth to change considerably in the forecasting period. It is also reasonable 
to assume that the growth rates for MHG will approach the overall growth 
rate in the economy as MHG becomes an increasingly dominant player in the 
a highly consolidated market. This indicates using a two-stage model when 
valuing MHG.  
 
In the backdrop of the above, a fundamental analysis will be conducted 
using the WACC approach, which will be supported by three market based 
analysis; sum-of-the-parts, peer analysis and precedent transactions.  
 
4.6 FUNDAMENTAL VALUATION AND MARKET BASED APPROACH   
A fundamental valuation consists of a multitude of factors that will each play 
a determinant role in deducting the firm value. Figure 6 describes the 
valuation approach when using a fundamental analysis. To calculate the 
enterprise value, the free cashflow to firm has to be estimated for a given 
period, referred to as the forecasting period. The forecasting period should 
reflect the time range when the firm is expected to have moderate growth. 
After that, the terminal value is calculated, reflecting the value of all future 
cashflows after the last year in the forecasting period at a low and stable 
growth rate. To calculate the value of the stock today, the terminal value and 
the free cashflows in the forecasting period has to be discounted with a 
discount rate reflecting the associated risk of the cashflows.  
 30 
 
Figure 6: To determine the company value, the FCF and cost of capital have to be estimated 
5. ANALYSIS OF MACROECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS 
At this point, the mechanisms of salmon farming have been described. 
Further, the different valuation approaches have been presented and it has 
been determined that the WACC method, supported by relative valuations, is 
the most appropriate analysis for conducting the valuation of MHG. This 
section presents the macroeconomic factors affecting the salmon farming 
industry. The macroeconomic analysis is divided into five sub-chapters 
comprising, political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, environmental 
and legal factors respectively. Here, the political and legal factors will be 
discussed as one, because the licenses are granted by the government.  
  
5.1 POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL ASPECTS  
Concessions limit the size of MHG’s operations in the different regions where 
they are present, which have a great impact over the future harvest the 
company can expect to achieve. Further, sanctions from Russia and China 
has had a large impact on the demand achieved in for Norwegian salmon in 
Asia in the resent years. In the following paragraphs I will elucidate on the 
impact from recent news on licenses in the different regions MHG is 
operating and the consequences and likely development of the sanctions in 
the future.   
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5.1.1 Licenses  
5.1.1.1 Domestic license distribution 
In order to produce salmon in Norway, a license from the government is 
required. The license system in Norway is regulated by the Aquaculture Act 
of 2005 (Regjeringen, 2005). The licenses are granted by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Trade, Industries and Fisheries and administered by the 
Directorate of Fisheries. Each license allows salmon farming both in fresh 
water for smolt production and at sea and the limit of number of sea licenses 
in Norway is currently 974. There are no such limitations for licenses for 
salmon farming in fresh water and these licenses can be applied for 
continuously. The production limitations in Norway is regulated by maximum 
allowed biomass (MAB), which is set for each license and for each 
production site. The MAB for each license is 780 tons (945 tons in Troms and 
Finnmark) and sites generally has a MAB between 2,340 and 4,680. The 
licenses can be traded among the players in the industry. However, further 
limitations restrict a player to control no more than 50% of the total biomass 
in any of the regions and 25% of the accumulated biomass in Norway. In 
addition, a player needs to apply to the Directorate of Fisheries in case 
where the volume exceeds 15% of the total Norwegian outstanding biomass 
(Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
Since 1982, only a limited amount of licenses has been rewarded in the years 
1985,1988,199, 2001, 2002 and 2009 in Norway (Marine Harvest ASA, 2014). 
Further the license system has been criticized for granting discounted 
licenses. In 2013, 45 green licenses for salmon farming was issued by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, which required the 
salmon farming companies to comply with certain environmental standards. 
35 of the 45 licenses required an exchange of an old license to obtain a new 
(Regjeringen, 2013). MHG was granted only one of the 45 licenses, as the 
Norwegian government was seeking to benefit the small and mid-sized 
players in the industry in order to secure the competition, and most of the 
concessions were granted Salmar and Cermaq (Intrafish, 2015).  
 
At the same time, The Norwegian Parliament voted on a white paper on 
aquaculture, which allows a maximum growth of 6% every two years given 
that certain environmental criteria are fulfilled (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). It 
has also been suggested to implement a rolling MAB system by the Seafood 
Norway (former Fishery- and Aquacultures National Association), which 
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allows increased production when the sea temperatures are more favorable. 
The system allows increased MAB during the fall when the temperatures are 
high and the salmon is growing faster, however the system requires the 
average biomass in a given year not to exceed the MAB. The system is 
expected to create more stable production cycles and increase the 
production from current levels. However, high temperatures also increase the 
risk of sea lice and diseases. This has created debate about whether the 
system is sustainable among players in the Norwegian salmon farming 
industry and the proposal has not yet been adopted (Intrafish, 2015).        
 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) argues that the Norwegian fish 
farming regulations do not comply with the EEA Agreement. ESA monitors 
compliance with European Economic Area rules in Norway, Liechtenstein 
and Iceland, enabling the countries to participate in the European internal 
market. For the past two decades there has been disagreements between 
Norwegian authorities and EU authorities on how Norway should regulate its 
fish farming industry. Norwegian authorities argue that fisheries and 
aquaculture policies are not a part of the EEA Agreement, and hence should 
be decided on domestic level. It is the Norwegian Government’s opinion that 
EEA law does not limit Norway’s discretion to distribute the production 
capacity of its domestic fish farming. Contrary, the ESA claims that Norway 
has to comply with the regulations given by the EEA Agreement (EFTA 
Surveillance Authority, 2014).  
 
Norwegian aquaculture is both included and excluded from EU policies. On 
one side, Norway is not participating in EU’s common fishery policies, and 
hence decides on how to manage its own aquaculture resources. At the 
same time, Norway does not have free access to the EU markets, and has to 
comply with quotas and duties on import. In order to converge to EU 
regulations, The Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 
proposed in May 2013 to change the rules of ownership control of the 
aquaculture industry. It is proposed to increase the ownership ceiling for a 
company from the current level of 25% to 40% of production capacity in the 
salmon farming industry. At the same time, there will be more stringent 
requirements for activities in coastal districts, hereby including requirements 
for R&D spending, which will be an important measure against the spreading 
of sea lice (Ministry of Fishery and Coastal Affairs, 2013).  
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I want to highlight that there is significant political risk related to both today’s 
MAB license system and the disperse regulations in Norway and the EU. 
However, former minister of fisheries has been positive to the change in the 
ceiling of ownership share in the Norwegian aquaculture sector 
(Undercurrent News, 2013). The recently instated minister of fisheries, Per 
Sandberg has also expressed positive attitudes towards growth in the 
Norwegian aquaculture sector, and his political party (FRP) also known to be 
against high involvements from the EU.  
 
In the volume forecasts I have assumed that the ceiling for ownership is 
increased above 25% in the next few years, allowing MHG to continue its 
growth within the 6% biannual allowed increase in biomass within each 
region, given the green efforts discussed above.  
 
5.1.1.2 Foreign license distribution  
Scotland: In Scotland there are no distributions of licenses, but the 
operations of sites have to be approved by different institutions. The MAB in 
Scotland is not uniformly set and depends on the environmental concerns, 
and generally varies between 100 tons and 2,500 tons. Applications are 
given for a 25-year period and any company’s total production capacity is 
limited by the Competition Commission Authorities (Marine Harvest ASA, 
2015).       
 
Chile: In 2010, licenses in Chile were no longer grated for infinite periods, 
but for a 25-year period, and the licenses will be renewable at the end of the 
period. The Chilean government is also looking to freeze the allocation of 
salmon licenses in the southern regions until 2020, in a bid to organize and 
better regulate the sector. The need for proper organization of the affairs in 
the region stems from the infectious salmon anemia (ISA) crisis in the region 
between 2008 and 2009, which led to thousands of redundancies and 
pushed several companies to the verge of bankruptcy (Intrafish, 2014).   
 
Canada: Licenses are issued for a period between 5 and 15 years and a 
typical license will range in size from 2,000 MT to 5,000 MT of MAB. New 
licenses will be issued as of July 2015 for a six-years period at the time, 
which will only be renewed for one year at a time. Application of 8 new 
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licenses has been applied for by the industry, were four of those are by 
MHG.      
 
The impact of license regulation is likely to slow down the growth in 
harvested volume in Norway as Norwegian production is approaching the 
maximum allowed biomass, which will be further deliberated under chapter 
11. It is also reasonable to assume that MHG will have harvest volume growth 
close to or equal to the maximum allowed biannual growth of 6% as the 
economic condition in Norway favor export of salmon. However, it is difficult 
to suggest future harvest volumes in the other regions where MHG is 
operating based on licenses, as the regulations are less concrete than in 
Norway. However, MHG has a large amount of their Chilean operations in the 
Southern parts of Chile - it is therefore unlikely that growth in harvest volumes 
in Chile will come from existing operations, and must therefore come through 
acquisitional growth (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
5.1.2 Sanctions  
After the Nobel’s Piece Prize was awarded the controversial dissident Liu 
Xiaobo in 2010, the market for Norwegian Salmon is now almost totally 
dismantled (E24, 2015).  The Chinese market was previously an important 
market for the export of Norwegian salmon comprising 90% of the total 
market share in China. Given the rapid growth in Chinese economy and a 
continuous growing middle class, predicting whether the sanctions will cease 
is an important indicator to estimate the growth in sales for Norwegian 
salmon. Earlier this year, the Norwegian and Chinese governments agreed 
on a certificate which again allowed for export of Norwegian salmon to China. 
Even though the export is not yet significant, the certificate indicates a future 
for Norwegian salmon in the Chinese market (Aftenposten, 2015).   
 
At the same time, Russia’s actions in Ukraine has lead to sanctions from USA 
and Europe, where Russia has been banned from a wide range of American 
and European markets. Russia’s response to this action was banning import 
on several goods from European and USA markets, which has also 
influenced the export Norwegian salmon to Russia. Nevertheless, Trond 
Davidsen, director for aquaculture in the Fishery and Aquaculture Industry 
Association in Norway, believes the sanctions introduced for Norwegian 
salmon will not be enhanced as suppliers of salmon are relatively few. The 
Russian market is the single largest market for Norwegian seafood, and 
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additional retrenchment from the Russian government will therefore have 
great impact on Norwegian suppliers of salmon (ibid). This year, Russia has 
started retreating troops from Ukraine and has resumed their supply of gas, 
which could indicate an advancement for peace in the Crimean region. If this 
continues sanctions may cease, supporting greater supply of Norwegian 
salmon to the Russian market (NRK, 2015).     
 
Norway’s relationship to Russia and China has improved considerably during 
the last year and it is wide consensus that the Asian demand for Norwegian 
salmon will improve going forward. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
increased demand and hence increased production volumes going forward. 
Nevertheless, the increased demand is dependent on the availability of 
licenses in the future, but since MHG has operations in many different 
regions it is reasonable to assume that the Asian demand can be supplied 
from other regions.  
 
5.2 ECONOMICAL ASPECTS 
An overview of the global trade flow of farmed Atlantic salmon was given in 
the overview in figure 4 in the chapter 2.3.2. The Norwegian market is 
predominantly exporting to Europe, Russia and Asia whilst the Chilean 
market is predominantly exporting to USA, South America and Asia. Since 
the majority of MHG’s production is in Norway and Chile, it is vital to address 
the economic condition in the countries that are Norway’s and Chile’s prime 
markets.  
 
The consumers of salmon are predominantly middle class, therefore an 
analysis of GDP per capita in the major export countries can give an 
indication for the future market for harvested salmon. The analysis is 
conducted for the main markets of Norwegian and Chilean salmon, as 
Norway and Chile comprise the majority of MHG’s harvested volumes. 
However, both the Chilean and Canadian operations export to the US and 
MHG’s other European plants predominately export to Europa. The following 
analysis therefore represents the majority of MHG’s operations and will 
provide a good estimate of the likely demand in the future. The overview in 
figure 7 below show the development in GDP per capita in the Europe, China 
and Russia, which is main markets for Norwegian salmon. Further it shows 
the GDP per capita development for Japan, Latin America and USA, which 
are main markets of Chilean salmon. The graph shows historical 
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development from 2005 until today and estimated GDP per capita until 2020. 
The growth in GDP per capita is expected to be slightly increasing for 
Europe, Russia, Latin America, and China. The GDP per capita is expected 
to grow at a faster rate in the US than in the other countries. The GDP for 
Japan is expected to decline until the end of 2015 and then increase but at a 
slower rate than historically (Knoema, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 7: GDP per capita is expected to increase in the most important markets for Norwegian 
and Chilean salmon (Knoema, 2015)  
A weaker Norwegian currency compared to the British pound, the US Dollar 
and the Euro, as seen in figure 8, has stimulated the export of Norwegian 
salmon. The result of this has been an accumulated export this year that is 
larger than at the same period last year (iLaks, 2015). In addition, it is wide 
consensus among major Norwegian banks that the weak Norwegian Krone 
will sustain for an extended period time (E24, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 8: The Norwegian Krone has weakened to the currency in its most important markets 
(Oanda, 2015) 
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Increases in GDP per capita in MHG’s prime markets for salmon suggest that 
the demand for salmon is likely to increase, because of socio-cultural factors 
outlined in section 5.3. In addition, the weaker Norwegian currency is likely to 
increase demand for Norwegian salmon, all else equal. However, the 
harvested volumes in Norway is nonetheless still dependent on the available 
licenses, and this will put an ultimate cap on the growth potentials. 
    
5.3 SOCIO-CULTURAL ASPECTS 
Some of the growth in demand is due to a rapidly increasing middle class 
and the general increase in disposable income among customers in export 
countries can be ascribed to the positive correlation of increased lifestyle 
and health, and environmental consciousness to disposable income. 
Increase in income often results in the desire to purchase food richer in 
minerals and vitamins, and ‘green’ and ecological products. Salmon is, as 
previously mentioned, rich in omega 3 acids, proteins, minerals and vitamins 
and is recognized as a product of great nutritional value in addition to being 
more environmental friendly than other animalistic protein, supporting greater 
supply of salmon with GDP per capita growth (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
Feed conversion ratio measures how productive the different protein 
productions are by dividing the kilograms of feed needed to increase the 
animal´s bodyweight by on kilogram. Salmon has a feed-conversion ratio that 
is considerable lower than other sources of protein that is potential 
substitutes to salmon, shown in the figure 9 below. The divided feed-
conversion ratio for cattle is due to difference in feed; grass and cereal 
respectively. In addition, salmon production is viewed as more climate 
friendly than the production of other animalistic protein sources. With growing 
population in the world, the production of salmon is therefore expected to be 
an important source of protein whilst limiting the negative impact on the 
environment. In addition, the salmon feed industry has started to use less fish 
oil and fish meal and more vegetable ingredients in their feed, which is more 
sustainable and environmental friendly (ibid). 
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Figure 9: The feed conversion ratio of salmon is considerably lower than other animalistic 
protein (ibid) 
 
Table 3 shows an overview of the carbon footprint and water consumption of 
different animalistic protein which are clearly oust by salmon.  
 
$
Salmon' Poultry' Pig' Cattle'
Carbon$footprint$(kg$CO2/kg$edible$meat)$ 2.9$kg$ 3.4$kg$ 5.9$kg$ 30.0$kg$
Water$consumption$(liter/kg$edible$meat)$ 1,400$liter$ 4,300$liter$ 6,000$liter$ 15,400$liter$
Table 3: Salmon is significantly more environmental friendly than other animalistic protein (ibid) 
 
5.4 TECHNOLOGICAL AND R&D ASPECTS 
Since 1994 the supply of Atlantic salmon has increased by 428%, which 
corresponds to an annual growth of 9%. Between 2003 and 2014 the annual 
growth has been 6% and Kontali Analyse predicts further decline in annual 
growth rates to 3% between 2014 and 2020. 
 
The reason for the decline in growth rates is that the industry has reached a 
production level where biological boundaries are being pushed. The recent 
ISA crisis in Chile has stressed the need to keep the growth in line with the 
industry’s biological footprint. This situation has raised the need for increased 
R&D efforts to find find pharmaceutical solutions to combat salmon lice 
(Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  The Norwegian industry is spending a total 
NOK 50 million on R&D directly related to the combat of salmon lice on a 
yearly basis, which illustrates the scale of the problem (Lusedata, 2015).       
 
The technological and R&D aspects suggest that greater supply can be 
achieved if the industry takes action in combating the problems with fish 
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health. MHG is seeking to enhance their R&D efforts in dealing with 
biological assets, which may cause the the mortality rates to decline and 
hence harvest volumes to increase. In addition, improved fish health also 
increases the quality of the fish and consequently the price achieved for 
salmon. Another reason for increased R&D efforts is that the Norwegian 
government requires a certain level of R&D spend and fulfill certain lice-to-
salmon ratios to obtain new licenses, and achieve a higher share of the 
Norwegian harvest volume. As MHG is expected to drive the consolidation 
trend previously discussed, the R&D spending will continue to increase for 
this very reason as well (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). 
 
5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS  
Some environmental factors were discussed under socio-cultural factors as 
people become more concerned with environmental friendly products with 
increased spending power. However, there are several other environmental 
factors affecting the volumes and price achieved for salmon, outlined below.  
   
The production of salmon is sensitive to climate and weather as well as force 
majeure events such as earthquakes. Climate changes has caused raising 
sea temperatures and acidifications of the ocean, which are large threats to 
the production of salmon. As discussed in section 2, the optimal temperature 
for the production of salmon ranges from 8 to 14°C and rising temperatures 
are therefore threatening the survival of the industry, especially Chile where 
the average temperature 12 degrees. Acidifications of the ocean may cause 
decreasing growth pace of salmon and in the worst case death, which has 
an impact on the production pace and price of salmon (Marine Harvest ASA, 
2015).  
 
Another challenge is extreme weather such as storms and hurricanes that 
strikes the coastlines, which causes salmon escapes from the net cages and 
therefore has a negative impact on the harvested volumes (and could cause 
high fines). In addition, earthquakes can both cause harm to the net cages 
and salmon to escape and can therefore decrease production volumes and 
make additional capital expenditures necessary. However, the threat of 
earthquakes will only be applicable to the operations in Chile for geological 
reasons (ibid). 
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It is impossible to predict whether the occurrence of storms and force 
majeure events is likely to change from current levels in the different regions 
producing salmon. However, the rapid climate changes over the last century 
which has been showed to rise the global temperatures and the occurrence 
of storms and other force majeure events, suggest that the salmon farming 
industry will experience more escapes and mortality in the future. 
Nevertheless, a historical global climate treaty was signed by 195 countries 
in December 2015, which is believed to achieve eminent reductions in global 
emissions among experts, which may cause the temperatures and force 
majeure events to stabilize in the future.  
 
Summarized, the macroeconomic analysis supports increasing volumes of 
harvested salmon in the future, even though the growth rate will be at lower 
levels in some regions due to the biological challenges. In addition, more 
stabilized weather conditions and temperatures and technology and R&D 
effort are likely to increase the price the salmon farming companies can 
expect to achieve as the quality of the fish improves, all else equal.   
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6. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS  
So far, the mechanisms of salmon farming have been explained, and the 
appropriate valuation methodology has been determined. An analysis of the 
macroeconomic conditions has concluded that there is a favorable outlook 
for the demand of salmon in the future, but that the industry is limited by 
regulations in form of licenses. In this chapter I will focus on the salmon 
farming sector itself and address competitive situation in the salmon farming 
industry by looking at the risk of new entrants, supplier power, consumer 
power, and substituting products.  
 
To be able to analyze the future prospects of Marine Harvest it is vital to 
conduct an industry analysis to get a sense of their competitive position. In 
order to do that one needs to properly define the players in the industry. I 
define the industry that MHG operates in to be salmon farming and 
processing. The implications of this is that the other kinds of seafood will be 
considered substitutes of harvested salmon. Marine Harvest has recently 
entered into the feed production market, and are by now ~80% self-sufficient 
in Norway, and is planning to expand their feed production to other regions. 
Consequently, MHG’s upstream suppliers will also be commodity vendors of 
the input in salmon feed, in addition to feed producers even though the 
relevance of these will diminish going forward.  
 
6.1 NEW ENTRANTS  
Geographical locations with conditions suited for salmon farming is limited. 
Board member of MHG, Cecilie Fredriksen, emphasized in a speech given at 
NHH in September that this natural limit of harvesting localities represents a 
large barrier of entry for potential new competing companies. Farmed salmon 
is only produced in Norway, Chile, UK, Faroe Islands, Ireland, North America 
and New Zealand due to biological constraints concerning temperature 
requirements and other natural constraints.  
 
Another large constraint is the licenses regime introduced by the authorities 
in the countries mentioned above. The licensing regime limit the amount of 
harvest of each company and varies in the different regions, which was 
discussed under the macroeconomic analysis.  
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Nevertheless, in 2015 the Minister of Fisheries in Norway stated that the 
government were open to assign permissions for land-based salmon 
production. This is a threat for sea based players as the land-based players 
are neither exposed to the environmental problems such as rising sea 
temperatures, storms and acidification of the ocean nor fish health problems 
caused by salmon lice. On the other hand, land-based production imply a 
significantly higher cost both in capital expenditures due to more technically 
advanced fish cages and operational costs due to circulation of water in the 
cages (Sysla, 2015).       
 
The salmon farming industry is very capital intensive, which creates a major 
barrier of entry. Long production cycles of salmon imply high working capital 
levels, as biological assets are categorized as capitalized assets before the 
salmon is harvested, which is a period of 2-3 years which can be seen in 
figure 5 in section 2.3.5. In addition, the industry requires high capital 
expenditures to acquire property, plant and equipment necessary for 
production (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). Land-based production therefore 
requires high salmon prices to break even, and is thus extra sensitive to the 
highly volatile salmon price, and it is therefore considered unlikely that this 
will pose a large threat for MHG in the short to medium term.  
 
There has been a growing trend of consolidations in all regions in the 
industry during the last decade, which is expected to continue (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015). This will result in fewer, but larger companies in the 
industry, consequently leading to larger benefits from economies of scale. 
Therefore, this trend will make it even harder for new companies to enter the 
industry. Analysts expect MHG to lead this trend because of their strong 
balance sheet and standing relationship with loan facilities (iLaks, 2014). In 
addition, the industry are spending millions per year to achieve FHL’s 
recommended salmon lice ratio of 0.5 per fish in average, and since the 
largest players in the industry has more funds, small players are not capable 
to maintain the same R&D efforts that are required for achieving the 
recommended sea lice ratio. (Sysla, 2015).  
 
Last, the USAs Food and Drug administration (FDA) has approved 
production of genetically modified salmon, which could threat the traditional 
production of salmon because of reduced production cycles. The genetically 
modified salmon can be produced in 16 to 18 months, while the production 
cycle for Atlantic salmon is 30 months (almost twice as long), consequently 
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their operational cost and working capital will be dramatically reduced. 
Nevertheless, only two hatcheries, one in Canada and one in Panama, have 
got the permission from the FDA to produce genetically modified salmon 
today. Still, if the production is successful and the demand is good, the FDA 
and food surveillance in other countries producing salmon might give out 
permissions to more players, which can threaten the traditional production of 
Atlantic salmon (E24, 2015). On the other land, SalmoBreed, a breeding 
company specializing in genomics selection, believes there is a long way 
from a FDA permission to commercially viable genetically modified salmon 
(iLaks, 2015). MHG is also seeking to develop their own fish egg plants in the 
future and it is assumed that MHG have the necessary financial funding to 
keep up with the most efficient production methods seen in the market today.  
 
The risk of new entrants is assumed to be low, because the industry is highly 
capital intensive, licenses are often distributed to existing players and there 
is a consolidation trend in the industry. In addition, the development of 
genetically modified salmon is in the early stages of testing and development 
and has not yet received many approvals for commercially production. 
Potential development of land-based plants is not considered as a treat for 
traditional salmon farming as the land-based plants are highly capital 
intensive and dependent on a high price for salmon to break-even. 
 
6.2 SUPPLIERS  
Since Marine Harvest supplies ~80% of their own feed in Norway and is 
looking to expand their operations it is therefore appropriate to introduce the 
historical and future prices on commodities used in salmon feed.  
 
As previously mentioned, the industry has gone from using a majority of fish 
oil and fish meal in production to vegetable ingredients consisting of 
rapeseed oil, soymeal and wheat. The share of each ingredient in production 
of feed in Chile and Norway today can be seen in the graphs 10 below. 
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Figure 10: Vegetable meal and oil are the main ingredient in Norwegian feed, while vegetable 
meal and oil and avian meal are the main ingredients in Chilean feed (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). 
The prices in USD per tons for the ingredients is shown in figure 11 below. 
The prices for fish oil and fish meal has increased steadily since 2009 and is 
considerable higher than the prices for the vegetable ingredients. The price 
for rapeseed oil has varied considerable, while the price for soymeal and 
wheat has been relatively stable (Knoema, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 11: The price for fish meal and fish oil has increased greatly during the last five years 
(Index Mundi, 2015)   
It is reasonable to assume that it will take a few years before Marine Harvest 
is totally self-sufficient of feed to their operations in all regions. Hence, an 
analysis for the main salmonid feed producers is necessary.  The industry of 
feed production has gone through a period with many consolidations and 
has since 2008 been controlled by three large producers; BioMar, Ewos and 
Skretting, which are all operating globally. The share of the largest players in 
the salmonid feed industry can be seen in the figure 12 below. Not only are 
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these companies the suppliers of feed, but also make up MHG’s competitors 
as MHG have become vertically integrated into feed production (ibid).  
 
Figure 12: Skretting (36%) and EWOS (35%) are the largest players in the feed market (ibid) 
 
The salmonid feed companies typically operate with cost-plus contracts, 
which fully reimburses the contractor for the cost of materials and an 
additional premium for the cost of the job. Consequently, by producing feed 
internally, salmon harvesting companies do not pay the additional premium. 
With fewer players in the salmonid feed industry, it is reasonable to assume 
that the premiums the players can charge is higher (ibid).  
 
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the input prices are the same for 
all players in the salmonid feed market, as the ingredients are fresh goods 
and prices should therefore be relatively close to the spot price found in the 
market. Consequently, the profitability of vertically integrate feed production 
is depended on the additional cost of feed production relative to the premium 
charged by salmonid feed producers. 
 
A considerable cost component, however far smaller than the feed cost, in 
producing farmed salmon is the cost of fertilized eggs. The supply of 
fertilized eggs is, as mentioned, dominated by four suppliers. A market 
dominated by few suppliers, facing a larger amount of customers allows for 
price fixing and it is reasonable to assume the salmon farming companies to 
a large extent is price takes in this market. Most fish egg suppliers operate 
with quantity discount and and different prices for spawn in their early-, mid- 
and late stage of life where late stages are the most expensive and early 
stages the least expensive. MHG is likely to achieve the maximum quantity 
discount with their vast production volumes. Looking at AquaGen’s price list 
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from 2013-2015 the price for one egg has increased by approximately NOK 
0.3-0.6 for different categories (AquaGen, 2015) (AquaGen, 2013).      
 
The power of suppliers is assumed to be low as MHG has developed their 
own feed plant and is seeking to be entirely self-sufficient in feed supply in 
the future. Nevertheless, the ingredients used in feed production are traded 
in the spot market which reduces the bargaining power of the customer. In 
addition, MHG is dependent on external supply of fertilized eggs, which is 
produced by few large suppliers decreasing their bargaining power 
additionally. The power of suppliers is therefor assumed to be high.  
 
However, the supplier power is likely to decrease if MHG becomes self-
sufficient in feed supply also in their international regions and pursuit their 
strategy of integrating fertilized egg supply in their internal operations. The 
latter will be discussed further under the firm specific analysis.    
 
6.3 CONSUMERS  
The buyer power depends on the levels of supply and demand and 
characteristics of the product. Since salmon is a fresh good and has to be 
sold immediately the buyer power is strong and the salmon farming is 
therefore price takers meaning they have to lower the price if the demand is 
low and is able to raise the price if the demand is high. Nevertheless, the 
salmon supply can be regulated to some extent with freezing the salmon, 
which increases the durability or postpone/accelerate the harvest volumes to 
some extent to when the market conditions are more favorable. However, this 
is assumed to have only limited impact on the bargaining power. Further, 
farmed salmon is a relatively homogenous product, which increase the buyer 
power additionally. A homogenous product reduces the bargaining power of 
the salmon farming companies because consumers will screen the market 
for the product with the lowest price as they regard the products as identical. 
Still, MHG also sells processed products that are more differentiated than the 
farmed salmon. This is assumed to reduce the bargaining power of 
consumers slightly. The customers of MHG’s processed products are to a 
high degree large supermarket chains, buying vast volumes. Also in this 
sector there has been a consolidating trend that has left only a few giants 
with large purchasing power within the regions the supermarket chains 
operate in.  
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The power of customers is assumed to be high as salmon is a fresh good 
and a highly a homogenous product, where the customer base is highly 
consolidated. However, MHG has increased their second processed marked 
with the acquisition of Morpol and the segment now comprise a large share 
of MHG’s total revenues, supporting slightly lower bargaining power.   
 
6.4 SUBSTITUTES  
Land animal still dominates protein sources for consumption, which can be 
seen in the figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 13: Land based animals dominate the animalistic protein consumption (Marine Harvest 
ASA, 2015). 
 
Under the environmental analysis in chapter 5.5, the feed conversion ratios 
for different types of animalistic protein were introduced. The analysis 
showed that salmon oust other types of animalistic protein with a feed-
conversion ratio of 1.1.  
 
The prices for different types of animalistic protein in outlined in figure 14, 
which shows that the price of salmon has declined over the past 5 years. Still 
the price of salmon is trading above the prices for other sources of 
animalistic protein. The buyers of animalistic protein are assumed to be price 
sensitive, which the lower consumption volumes of salmon compared to 
other animalistic protein indicates. Still, the increasing amount of 
consolidation in the industry is likely to reduce the cost as the fewer yet 
larger players will probable benefit from increased economies of scale.  
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At the same time the economic conditions in the main markets are expected 
to improve, seen in the GDP per capita graph introduced under the 
economic macro analysis. As previously mentioned, increased income is 
assumed to raise the customers’ awareness of healthy and environmental 
products. Salmon is both viewed as healthier and more environmental sound 
than the other sources of animalistic protein presented below.  
 
 
Figure 14: The price for salmon has showed a decreasing trend in recent years, but is still 
considerable higher than prices for other animalistic protein (Index Mundi, 2015). 
 
‘Tilapia and other cichilds’ and ‘Alaska pollock’ still dominates the global 
consumption of fish species and other seafood, illustrated by the size of the 
bar in figure 15.   
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Figure 15: White fish still dominates the global consumption of protein from aquaculture (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015). 
 
Nevertheless, production of salmon is associated with the lowest level of risk 
and the highest degree of industrialization among other fish species, 
depicted in the figure 16 below. Consequently, the production of salmon has 
higher barriers of entry than its substitutes because of capital intensive 
production. It is also reasonable to assume that the volumes are more stable 
in the production of salmon as a consequence of the lower level of risk.      
 
Figure 16: Production of salmon is in a unique position compared to production of other fish 
species because of low levels of risk and high level of industrialization in production (ibid). 
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The power of substitutes is assumed to be high as the prices of other 
sources of protein are relatively lower and that consumers are price sensitive. 
Still, the cost of producing, in addition to health and environmental concerns, 
is more beneficial for salmon. In addition, salmon farming has a higher 
degree of industrialization and lower level of risk than other fish species 
which suggest a better competitive position compared to the other fish- and 
seafood types. However, consumers are price sensitive when it comes to 
protein and the threat from substitutes is therefore set to a medium to high 
level.  
 
6.5 RIVALRY  
I have previously described the ongoing consolidation trend in the salmon 
farming sector, which has left a few large players. MHG is by far the largest 
of the market players, and enjoy a market leader position in most of the 
regions where the company is present. Further, the salmon farming industry 
is regulated by the governments, controlling market shares by requiring 
licenses to operate. This will limit the degree of rivalry between the different 
market players, as they have limited leeway to rapidly increase their market 
share.  
 
Further, I have discussed the benefits from scale in salmon farming. MHG is 
the only major player that has a fully integrated value chain, and they will 
most likely benefit largely from this, as their bargaining power with their 
upstream suppliers is superior to that of their competitors. The scale benefits 
will also be an important factor in the combat against sea lice to keep the 
mortality rates at a sufficiently low level, as large R&D efforts are required to 
stall the losses from fish deceases and loss of quality. This will further reduce 
the degree of rivalry in the sector. 
 
Lastly, farmed salmon is a highly commoditized good, and is trading at spot 
price in a freely traded market. This facilitates for price competition between 
the players. Lately, the salmon price has been increasing due to increased 
demand, and the sector has been more and more demand driven. As long 
as there are regulative limitations to volume, and the demand is high, the 
price is remaining high and will benefit the profitability for the entire sector. 
However, MHG also offers a large product range in the processes salmon 
market, and these products are far more differentiated than primary 
processed salmon. Overall, the rivalry in the sector is at a medium to high, 
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due to MHG’s dominating position as a vertical integrated market leader and 
the demand driven price development.  
 
MHG’s position in the competitive market will be more thoroughly discussed 
in the next section, where I will elaborate on MHG’s competitive strengths 
and weaknesses. 
 
6.6 SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE SITUATION 
The competitive situation in the salmon farming industry is summarized in 
figure 17, where customer power is high, supplier power and threat of 
substituting products is medium/high and threat of new entrants is low. 
Summarized the degree of rivalry in the salmon farming industry is deemed 
to be medium/high.  
 
 
Figure 17: Customers is deemed to have the highest bargaining power in the salmon farming 
industry 
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7. COMPANY ANALYSIS 
To this point the mechanisms of salmon farming has been explained, and it 
has been determined that the WACC method is the appropriate valuation 
method for MHG. It has also been concluded that the macroeconomic 
conditions are favorable to MHG, although restricted by regulations. Further 
the competitive situation in the salmon farming sector has been assessed to 
be at a medium to high level. This chapter will present MHG’s capabilities, 
and will in turn address the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
of MHG in order to determine how well they are positioned in relation to other 
players in the salmon farming industry.  
 
 
Figure 18: MHG is expanding in all their segments, however they are threatened by governments 
prioritizing SMEs out of consideration for competition. 
 
Figure 18 outlines MHG’s main strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats, which are both company-specific, industry-wide and macroeconomic 
factors. Since the two latter has been discussed in the previous chapters, I 
will only elaborate on the firm-specific factors in this chapter 
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7.1 STRENGTHS  
MHG is the market leader in every region producing salmon except in 
Canada where MHG is the second largest producer. The industry has, as 
previously mentioned, entered into a consolidation phase, where MHG is 
expected to lead due to their strong financial position and superior size. 
MHG has acquired Morpol in 2013, a leading player in the processing 
segment, which has significantly increased the VAP segments contribution to 
accumulated income. The increasing VAP segment achieved by acquiring 
Morpol can also increase the pricing power of MHG as more of the 
accumulated income steams from secondary processed products that are 
more generally enjoying higher margins.  
 
In addition, MHG Chile merged with AquaChile in 2014 and MHG now owns 
42.8% of the combined entity, with an option to increase shareholding to at 
least 55% (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). The merged entity is the second 
largest salmon farming company in the world by volume after MHG itself. 
Going forward the increasing consolidations could reduce MHG’s cost as a 
result of increasing economies of scale. In addition, increasing consolidation 
can solve the problem with access to additional licenses in existing 
corporations. Further, the accumulated volume in Norway is reaching 
towards the MAB, which will be discussed in chapter 11. Consolidations can 
therefore provide MHG with additional volumes in Norway, presumed they do 
not exceed the limit of 25% share of accumulated Norwegian MAB and the 
6% biannual limit on volume growth. 
 
MHG changed their strategic course by deciding to become a fully 
integrated producer of seafood protein in 2012 (Marine Harvest ASA, 2013) 
and has in subsequent years entered into the salmonid feed production 
industry. Including in-house feed production in their value chain is likely to 
give them a competitive advantage in the salmon farming industry as their 
COGS potentially could be lower than competitors using external suppliers 
that operate with “cost plus” contracts. MHG is the only salmon farming 
company who is somewhat self-sufficient in the feed segment and it is 
reasonable to believe that the advantage will persist as the investment 
required for developing the feed plant in Bjugn was NOK 700 million (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2014). MHG is significantly larger in size and financial strength 
than its peers and Lerøy, the next largest salmon farming company in 
Norway, is only 38% of MHG size measured by volume. Assuming that 
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volume determines the size of the feed plant required to cover in-house 
needs, Lerøy is faced with an investment of NOK 260M developing their own 
feed plant. This is a substantial investment and may be harder for Lerøy and 
other peers to justify as they do not achieve the same degree of economies 
of scale because of lower volumes than MHG. It is reasonable to believe that 
MHG will increase their pricing power as ingredients used in feed are fresh 
goods and their price is therefore highly dependent on demand. At the same 
time MHG can enter into futures contracts on commodities used in feed to 
hedge the price risk.     
 
The biological assets are vulnerable and especially in their early stages of 
life, where the highest mortality rate occurs in the first 1-2 months after smolt 
is transferred to seawater (Marine Harvest ASA, 2014). Having the process of 
spawning and smolt integrated in their operations will therefore mitigate a 
large share of the risks associated with mortality in biological assets. At the 
same time, the introduction of in-house feed production has made MHG 
more vertically integrated and their value chain now almost comprise all 
process between eggs and secondary processed products presented in 
figure 19.  
 
Figure 19: MHG has a highly integrated value chain 
 
MHG is also diversified in their operations, with presence in all regions 
suitable for salmon farming except New Zealand. A diversified production 
limits the biological risk as this restricts the magnitude of losses caused by 
force majeure events, weather and diseases. 
 
7.2 WEAKNESSES 
MHG was self-sufficient in fertile egg supply until they in 2012 decided to sell 
off their 31.3% share in AquaGen, a supplier of fertilized salmon eggs 
(Marine Harvest ASA, 2012). This has made MHG dependent on external 
producers for fertilized eggs, but they are however seeking to again produce 
their own eggs in the future to ensure the best selection of generic 
properties. Since the production of fish eggs is easy to scale, an in-house 
egg-production will provide MHG with more flexibility in adjusting the volume 
to prices and demand than being dependent on an intermediary.  
Eggs Spawning Smolt Farming	 Fish	Feed	 Processing	 Sales	 Distribution
MHG
Primary Secondary
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7.3 OPPORTUNITIES  
MHG is expected to lead the consolidation trend in the salmon farming 
industry. In 2014 MHG acquired region XI in Chile and merged with the 
Chilean salmon farming firm AquaChile (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). The two 
actions are likely to strengthen MHG’s competitive position in Chile and 
increase their output in the region when the fish health issues have been 
resolved. In addition, consolidations can solve the problem with obtaining 
additional licenses, especially in Norway, elaborated on in section 6.1.  
 
Further, if MHG decides to develop additional feed plants in other regions, 
their operational costs is likely to decrease even further, hence enhancing 
their completive advantage in other regions. Being self-sufficient in feed 
supply also allows MHG to optimize the feed ingredients used in production. 
The share of fish meal and fish oil, which has had rapidly increasing prices 
historically, still comprise 20-25% of total ingredients as shown in figure 10 in 
section 6.2. Reducing the amount of ingredients from fish can therefore 
reduce the operational cost, as feed cost comprise ~50% of total operational 
cost (ibid). 
 
MHG also has the opportunity to expand their operations by introducing 
other fish species in their product range. To estimate whether the product is 
strategically wise to implement it is beneficial to assess different fish species 
by two dimensions; the amount of cost and capability sharing and the 
amount of customer sharing. Other breeding fish is assumed to have 
relatively high cost and capability sharing as salmon, as the PP&E required 
for breeding and smolt production is similar. However, harvest of wild fish is 
assumed to have some degree of cost and capability sharing as primary 
processing plants and distribution channels already exist. However, the 
production of wild fish will most likely require a large capital expenditure in 
fishing boats. I therefore find it unlikely that expanding in the wild fish 
segment will be most profitable. Further, the fish is assumed to have large 
customer sharing with salmon because the fish vastly used in the secondary 
processed segment and it has the same nutritional value as salmon. Cod, 
trout and arctic charr are both apparent in the secondary processed market 
and can all be produced by breeding. I will argue that the trout is the fish 
specie with the highest customer sharing to salmon, as the nutritional value is 
similar and that smoked salmon and smoked trout comprise the majority of 
secondary processed products of the fish species. These fish species could 
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therefore also potentially enjoy cost sharing in the VAP segment, and I argue 
that producing trout is the choice with the most cost synergies and hence the 
most obvious. However, producing trout can cannibalize existing salmon 
products, which may favor cod.  
 
MHG holds all the necessary PP&E to expand in the luxury VAP segment, 
and I find it likely that a preferred first-step for expansion is into producing 
luxury processed goods such as high quality sashimi. This good has 
relatively low customer sharing with current products as most of the income 
steams from primary processed goods, even though the customer sharing 
between smoked salmon and sashimi is likely to be higher. Figure 20 exhibits 
the market definition matrix for different fish products and their associated 
cost and customer sharing with salmon.   
 
 
 
Figure 20: Market definition matrix 
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7.4 THREATS 
Small and mid-sized salmon farming companies was prioritized when 
licenses was distributed in Norway in 2014. Since MHG is the largest player 
in almost every region producing salmon, they might face problems of 
getting additional licenses because of competitive concerns. MHG share of 
total volume produced in Norway in 2014 was ~22.3%, and is therefore 
approaching the maximum of 25% of the total outstanding biomass. 
However, I find it likely that the 25% limit will be raised or removed as has 
been discussed by the government and I therefore base future harvest 
volumes on the suggested maximum biannual growth of 6%.   
 
The firm analysis finds that MHG holds a strong position in its peer group - a 
position that is likely to be enhanced considering the predicted consolidation 
trend in the future. The Norwegian laws also favor growth in the sector and it 
is discussed whether the stringent regulations regarding the maximum limit 
of total biomass should be removed, which can drive further consolidations in 
Norway for MHG. At the same time MHG is becoming increasingly vertically 
integrated in their value chain and has ambitions to become entirely 
integrated in the future. Expanding the feed production initiative to other 
regions is likely to decrease the feed cost as MHG avoids the “cost plus” 
contracts of salmonid feed suppliers.  
 
MHG is also seeking to become self-sufficient in egg supply, which can be 
critical in reducing the mortality rates as the biological risk is the largest in 
the salmons’ early stages of life. Fertilized eggs are currently supplied by 
external suppliers and therefore represents a weakness in MHG’s operations. 
In addition to opportunities regarding further consolidations and vertical 
integration, MHG has the necessary scope and equipment to expand into 
other fish specie markets or increased presence in VAP segment supplying 
the luxury market of salmon. However, their potential scope is currently 
limited by the stringent regulations, but it is suggested that the regulations 
will be eased in the future.            
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8. HISTORICAL ACCOUNTING FIGURES  
At this stage I have assessed the strategy and concluded that MHG is a 
strong company endowed to defend its position as market leader in an 
industry with healthy outlooks. I have also determined that the WACC 
approach is the appropriate valuation method. In the following chapter I will 
present the historical accounting figures of MHG to form the basis for 
normalization and earnings quality analysis conducted in chapter 9.  
8.1 TIME PERIOD OF ANALYSIS 
The time period used for the historical figures is 7 years, which is consistent 
with Damodaran’s recommendations. The reason for the choice of time 
period is that MHG was established in 2006 after being acquired by Pan 
Fish, and the period between 2008 and 2014 is therefore believed to reflect 
normal operations.  
8.2 HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE  
Table 4 is MHG’s historical income statement, which show a relatively volatile 
sales growth, however the gross profit margin has been relatively stable. The 
EBITDA margin has been more volatile than the gross profit margin, which is 
due to the variations in fair value adjustments in biological assets and 
harvested fish.  
 
Income$statement$$ 2008A$ 2009A$ 2010A$ 2011A$ 2012A$ 2013A$ 2014A$
Revenues$ 13$125$ 14$620$ 15$281$ 15$757$ 15$420$ 19$177$ 25$300$
Growth'
$
11.4'%' 4.5'%' 3.1'%' .2.1'%' 24.4'%' 31.9'%'
Other$income$ 0 0$ 0$ 375$ 43$ 22$ 231$
Revenue$and$other$income$ 13$125$ 14$620$ 15$281$ 16$133$ 15$464$ 19$199$ 25$531$
Growth'
$
11.4'%' 4.5'%' 5.6'%' .4.1'%' 24.2'%' 33.0'%'
Cost$of$Materials$ 8$505 8$797$ 7$781$ 8$399$ 9$667$ 9$999$ 13$677$
COGS'/'Sales' 65'%' 60'%' 51'%' 53'%' 63'%' 52'%' 54'%'
Gross'Profit' 4'620' 5'823' 7'501' 7'734' 5'797' 9'201' 11'854'
Gross'profit'margin' 35.2'%' 39.8'%' 49.1'%' 49.1'%' 37.6'%' 48.0'%' 46,9'%'
Fair$value$uplift$on$harvested$fish$ 0$ 0$ 0$ 3$251$ 1$576$ 4$324$ 5$518$
Fair$value$adjustment$on$biological$assets$ 279$ M301$ M1$092$ M1$737$ M1$926$ M6$118$ M5$008$
Salary$and$personnel$expenses$$ 2$140$ 2$167$ 2$203$ 2$213$ 2$419$ 2$674$ 3$321$
Other$operating$expenses$$ 1$394$ 1$448$ 1$454$ 2$063$ 2$164$ 2$582$ 3$350$
EBITDA' 808' 2'509' 4'936' 1'944' 1'565' 5'739' 4'672'
EBITDA'margin' 6'%' 17'%' 32'%' 12'%' 10'%' 30'%' 18'%'
Depreciation$and$amortization$ 685$ 688$ 653$ 667$ 677$ 763$ 966$
Provision$for$onerous$contracts$$ 0$ 0$ 14$ 6$ 6$ 125$ M24$
Restructuring$costs$ 241$ 170$ 4$ 22$ 1$ 273$ 53$
Other$nonMoperating$items$$ $$ 0$ 0$ 0$ 0$ 74$ 168$
Income/Loss$from$associated$companies$$ M6$ M70$ M202$ 9$ M88$ M222$ M150$
Impairment$loss$$ 1$579$ 373$ 5$ 67$ 0$ 65$ 24$
EBIT' P1'692' 1'348' 4'461' 1'174' 969' 4'662' 3'634'
Table 4: Historical income statement (Marine Harvest ASA, Annual Report 2009-2014) 
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Table 5 offers an overview of MHG’s assets, which shows that licenses and 
PPE comprise most of MHG’s non-current assets. The reason for the drop in 
the value of both licenses and PP&E in 2009 is due to the downsizing of 
operations in Chile as a result of the Panaceas disease in the region (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015). The biological assets comprise the larges current asset, 
which is the value of the fish in the stage between being smolt and 
harvested-ready fish. The biological assets have increased sharply the past 
two years, which will lead to higher volume output in the following 24-month 
period, all else equal. The asset varies with the amount of fish being 
produced, length of production cycle, and diseases and escapes.  
         
NonMCurrent$Assets$ 2008$ 2009$ 2010$ 2011$ 2012$ 2013$ 2014$
Licenses$ 5$767$ 5$410$ 5$443$ 5$578$ 5$435$ 6$036$ 6$514$
Goodwill$ 2$240$ 2$143$ 2$112$ 2$146$ 2$116$ 2$375$ 2$417$
Deferred$tax$assets$ 2$240$ 55$ 119$ 160$ 74$ 179$ 147$
Other$intangible$assets$$ 160$ 136$ 133$ 123$ 114$ 188$ 167$
Total'Intangible'assets' 10'406' 7'743' 7'806' 8'007' 7'739' 8'778' 9'245'
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Net$Property,$plant$and$equipment$$ 4$244 3$518 3$885 4$168 4$112 6$677 7$235
Investment$in$associated$companies$$ 514$ 520$ 679$ 624$ 647$ 900$ 1$022$
Other$shares$$ 79$ 119$ 124$ 92$ 1$009$ 132$ 166$
Other$nonMcurrent$assets$$
$
M63$ 3$ 26$ 73$ 9$ 15$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Total'nonPcurrent'assets'' 15'242' 11'837' 12'497' 12'917' 13'580' 16'497' 17'683'
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Current$Assets$ 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Inventory$ 1$075$ 743$ 776$ 783$ 820$ 1$751$ 2$401$
Biological$assets$ 5$621$ 5$351$ 7$278$ 6$285$ 6$104$ 9$537$ 9$914$
Net$Trade$receivables$$ 1$903$ 1$672$ 1$845$ 1$915$ 1$782$ 3$191$ 3$360$
Other$receivables$$ 532$ 552$ 815$ 610$ 593$ 1$097$ 1$111$
Cash$ 373$ 172$ 319$ 279$ 335$ 606$ 1$195$
Total'Current'Assets' 9'504' 8'490' 11'033' 9'872' 9'634' 16'182' 17'981'
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Assets$held$for$sale$$
$ $ $
0 0 1$059 19
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $TOTAL'ASSETS''' 24'746' 20'327' 23'529' 22'789' 23'214' 33'738' 35'682'
Table 5: Historical balance sheet (Marine Harvest ASA, Annual Report 2009-2014) 
 
The table 6 gives an overview of MHG’s liabilities and show that non-current 
interest bearing debt comprise the largest singe liability on MHG’s balance 
sheet. The non-current interest bearing debt consists of a revolving credit 
facility with a EUR 555 million limit, a NOK 1,250 million bond with maturity in 
2018 and to convertible bonds of EUR 350 million and EUR 375 million with 
maturity in May 2018 and June 2017 respectively (Marine Harvest ASA, 
2015). 
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Current$Liabilities$ 2008$ 2009$ 2010$ 2011$ 2012$ 2013$ 2014$
Current$tax$liabilities$$ 70$ 51$ 50$ 87$ 26$ 253$ 525$
Current$interestMbearing$debt$ 1$366$ 130$ 430$ 157$ 378$ 687$ 7$
Trade$payables$$ 1$729$ 1$340$ 1$450$ 1$482$ 1$453$ 2$233$ 2$039$
Other$current$liabilities$$ 2$350$ 1$049$ 1$112$ 1$180$ 1$475$ 1$968$ 3$112$
Total'Current'Liabilities' 5'515' 2'570' 3'042' 2'906' 3'332' 5'140' 5'684'
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Liabilities$held$for$sale$$
$ $ $ $ $
191 0
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Net$Current$assets$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Total$assets$less$current$liabilities$ 19$231 17$757 20$488 19$883 19$882 28$598 29$998
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $NonMCurrent$Liabilities$ 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
NonMcurrent$interestMbearing$debt$$ 733$ 5$117$ 5$107$ 6$589$ 5$339$ 7$710$ 10$669$
Deferred$Tax$Liabilities$ 6$748$ 1$143$ 2$238$ 2$352$ 2$544$ 3$365$ 3$569$
Other$nonMcurrent$liabilities$$ 117$ 100$ 571$ 99$ 415$ 976$ 2$334$
Total$NonMCurrent$Liabilities$ 7$597$ 6$359$ 7$916$ 9$041$ 8$297$ 12$051$ 16$572$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Total'Liabilities' 13'112' 8'929' 10'958' 11'946' 11'629' 17'381' 22'256'
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Table 6: Historical levels of liabilities (Marine Harvest ASA, Annual Report 2009-2014) 
 
Share capital and retained earnings comprise most of MHG’s total equity 
exhibited in table 7. The share capital has been relatively stable throughout 
the historical period, while levels of retained earnings has been relatively 
volatile.   
 
Equity$ 2008$ 2009$ 2010$ 2011$ 2012$ 2013$ 2014$
Share$capital$ 2$609$ 2$681$ 2$681$ 2$686$ 2$811$ 3$078$ 3$078$
Retained$Earnings$ 23$ 3$023$ 18$ 55$ 779$ 2$955$ 9$268$
Cash$flow$hedge$reserve$$ M830$ 117$ 275$ 172$ 89$ 58$ 24$
Share$based$payment$$ 8$693$ 5$918$ $ $ $ 8$ 31$Foreign$currency$translation$reserve$ 1$ M762$ M403$ M436$ M782$ M151$ 661$
Other$equity$ M916$ 439$ 9$929$ 8$290$ 8$722$ 10$370$ 1$641$
NonMcontrolling$interest$ 45$ 45$ 71$ 76$ 69$ 28$ 16$
Total'Equity' 9'625' 11'461' 12'571' 10'842' 11'689' 16'346' 14'718'
Table 7: Historical levels of equity (Marine Harvest ASA, Annual Report 2009-2014) 
 
In the following chapter I will conduct an earnings quality analysis and 
normalization of post in the income statement and balance sheet to retrieve 
the cost and assets which is directly related to MHG’s operations in order to 
conduct a valuation that reflect the core operations of the company.   
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9. NORMALIZATION AND EARNINGS QUALITY ANALYSIS 
This section presents normalization of figures in the income statement and 
balance sheet in order to determine the recurrent operational cost levels and 
balance sheet sizes, to be able to conduct a valuation of MHG’s core 
operations.  
    
9.1 VALUE ADJUSTMENTS BIOLOGICAL ASSETS 
The biological assets are measured at their fair value less their cost to sell, 
with exceptions where the fair value can not accurately be measured. The 
market for live fish do not exist, therefore the fair value is hypothetical and is 
calculated based on adjusted market prices for harvested fish less 
harvesting cost and freight cost (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
The biological assets consist of salmon in different stages in production and 
is calculated differently depending on each stage. Salmons at or above 
harvest size are calculated with their full estimated fair value. The biological 
asset value of salmons with weight between 1 and 4 kg, calculated as their 
relative share of future value. Last, the smolt and broodstock with weight 
below 1 kg has a biological asset value equal to their accumulated cost 
(ibid).  
 
The fair value is based on the expected market price, which is calculated 
based on the price achieved in the last months and recent contracts entered 
into (ibid). Nevertheless, the historical prices and contract prices do not 
necessarily imply anything about future prices and hence the operational 
income MHG will achieve. Therefore, the fair value adjustments on biological 
assets and harvested fish is set equal to 0 in the forecast period.     
 
To get an overview whether the capital is tied in biological assets and has 
been stable, it is beneficial to compute the historic biological asset-to-sales 
ratio, shown in figure 21 below. The variations in biological assets can be 
caused by adjustments to the expected demand, mortality and escapes and 
revaluation and devaluation of the quality. The quality of salmon is 
determined by sea temperatures that heavily influence the pace of growth 
and can cause diseases. The temperatures vary by time of year and across 
regions (ibid).    
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The relatively low ratio in 2009, is because of the Panaceas disease that 
broke out in Chile in 2008 and the relatively high levels in 2013 because of 
the income from secondary processed products from Morpol (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 21: Days biological-to-sales ratio outstanding has varied around 40-50%. 
 
9.2 RESTRUCTURING  
The restructuring costs in MHG has varied considerably from year-to-year, 
and differ in magnitude from NOK 273 million in 2013, NOK 241 million and 
NOK 170 million to NOK 1 million in 2012. The especially high restructuring 
cost in 2013 was due to the approval of the restructuring plan to reduce the 
number of processing plants within VAP Europe from 13 to 8, which was 
implemented the same year as a result of sustained losses (Marine Harvest 
ASA, 2014). Further, the high restructuring cost in 2008/2009 was a result of 
the extensiveness of Pancreas disease in Chile which required downscaling 
of the operation and therefore resulted in high restructuring costs (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2010). 
 
It is important to decide whether the high restructuring cost discussed above 
can be considered as extraordinary events to be able to predict restructuring 
costs in the forecasting period. Combating salmon lice is still a huge problem 
which requires significant amounts of funds for each year, and it is therefore 
reasonable to expect the events in 2008/2009 to reoccur. At the same time, 
there are expected to more consolidations in the salmon farming industry in 
the future, which may raise the need for restructuring. Consequently, the 
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exceptionally high restructuring costs is recognized as ordinary and is based 
on an average for the forecasting period.             
 
9.3 SG&A 
Figure 22 below shows that the historical SG&A costs has been relatively 
stable to sales, varying between 10% and 13%. The higher levels in recent 
years is partly due to the consolidation with Morpol and partly due to higher 
maintenance, rents, leases, third party services and other expenses. The 
increased maintenance cost and rent & leases cost is attributable to 
increased seawater activity in farming and the remaining were mainly driven 
by the consolidation of Morpol (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
Since the industry is characterized by continual consolidations, the forecast 
period is based on an average of the historical figures to reflect the 
increased operational expenses associated with a consolidation discussed 
above. 
 
Figure 22: The SG&A-to-sales ratio has been relatively stable varying between 10-13%. 
 
Figure 23 below show that the salary-to-sales ratio is also relatively stable 
varying between 13-16%. The increase in wages is both due to increased 
number of employees and higher gross wages. The number of employees 
has grown from 6,148 in 2010, after significantly staff reductions in 
2008/2009 due to the Panaceas disease in Chile, to 11,715 in 2014. The 
salary is expected to grow with sales in the future and is based on the 
average of the historical period (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). 
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Figure 23: The salary to sales ratio has been relative stable historically, varying between 13-16%  
I have argued that there are scale advantages in the salmon farming 
industry. MHG is expected to drive the consolidation trend that will continue 
also in the future, and will consequently gain scale. Cost synergies are hard 
to quantify without knowing the details about the companies that will be 
acquired, so I have chosen to take a conservative approach and assume that 
these synergies will be limited. I have forecasted that the EBITDA margin will 
remain at the current level, with only a slight increase towards the end of the 
forecast period. 
 
9.4 OTHER ADJUSTMENTS IN THE INCOME STATEMENT  
Other income mainly consists of management fees charges to MHG’s 
business units to compensate the mangers for their time and expertise and 
the income is therefore internal income (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). 
Consequently, other income is not representative for MHG’s operational 
income and should therefore be entirely removed.  
 
Provisions for onerous contracts appear when the cost of fulfilling a contract 
providing farmed salmon exceed the compensation from the buyer. This 
situation can occur both is the harvested volumes are low, causing delay for 
delivery and when market prices are higher than the contract price (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015). The post has varied considerable since 2008 to 2014 
and is therefore estimated to comprise an average of the historical period.  
 
Other non-operating items consist of accrual for contingent liabilities and 
provisions and is therefore not considered as operational cost and hence set 
equal to zero in the forecasting period. In addition, the cost has been zero 
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every year except the two last years and can therefore be recognized as 
transitory.       
 
Income and loss from associated companies is income from companies 
where MHG owns a considerable share of the company (between 20-50%) 
(ibid). This post has in the previous year been varying between being 
positive and negative. Without further analyses on each individual company, I 
will not make the assumption that their condition is going to improve nor 
worsen going forward, and I set it to zero as a fair middle point.  
 
Last, impairment losses are resulting from a reduction in the net carrying 
value of an asset, which is the acquisition cost minus the accumulated 
depreciation. If an asset is sold because a firm no longer expects to benefit 
from the asset, and the price obtained for the asset is less than its net 
carrying value an impairment loss occurs. Since the price obtained for assets 
sold in the future can not be predicted, the post is set to zero, hence the 
assets are presumed to be sold at their net carrying value in the future.   
 
9.5 CAPEX 
To maintain the current operation capacity, reinvestments has to be made to 
replace depreciated PP&E. The capex in a specific year therefore has to 
exceed the depreciation cost in the same year for a company to grow. MHG 
has had capital expenditures exceeding depreciation every year since 2008 
except in 2009 where the capex/depreciation ratio is below maintenance 
capex levels, which is displayed in figure 24 below. The almost constant 
capex-to-depreciation ratio is reflected in MHG’s historical growth rates in 
sales which has been positive every year except in 2012.  
 
 
Figure 24: Capex has been higher than maintenance capex all years in the historical period 
except 2009, which indicates that the firm is growing its PP&E 
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The capital expenditures have been considerable higher in 2013 and 2014, 
which is due to the development of the feed producing plant. The capex-to 
sales ratio is outlined in the figure 25 below, where the ratio is relatively 
stable in all years except 2013. Since MHG has ambitions of being entirely 
self-sufficient of feed and fertilized eggs in all regions in the future, the future 
capital expenditures should reflect the capital expenditures related to the 
feed plant in 2013 and 2014. The capital expenditures are therefore based 
on 2014 figures, with a ratio slightly above average. The reason for using 
2014 levels is that the main production is based in Norway and the capex 
made for feed production in Norway will therefore be higher than in other 
regions. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the cost of developing a 
feed plant in Norway is relatively more expensive than developing in Chile, 
region with second largest harvested volumes, which enforces the argument 
above. At the same time, the capital expenditure estimated for next year is in 
consensus of analysts estimates of a capital expenditure of NOK ~900 
million.
 
Figure 25: Capex-to-sales ratio has been relatively stable in the period, with somewhat higher 
levels in recent years 
 
A relatively large fraction of plant and machinery was sold in 2011, which is 
illustrated by the peak in the sale of PPE to sales ratio in the figure 26 below. 
MHG’s property pant and equipment have a useful life of 3-6 years and it is 
therefore reasonable to assume that the sale of assets recur frequently and 
that the 2011 levels are higher than normal. The sale of fixed asset is 
therefore based on last year levels (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).     
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Figure 26: The purchase of PPE has varied in the historical period and has been especially high 
in the last couple of years 
 
9.6 WORKING CAPITAL 
Net working capital (NWC) is capital that is tied in operations, and is 
measured as seen in equation 8: 
 ^;/ = /$99%J,&">>%,> − @$99%J,&#+"\+#+,+%>& 
Equation 8: Basic net working capital equation 
 
However, net working capital is a part of the operational capital to the firm, 
hence only operational assets and liabilities should be included in the 
calculation. The NWC can therefore be written as equation 9 (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2014):    
 ^;/ = IJO%J,'9- + <@@'$J,>&9%@+%O"\#%& + /">ℎ − <@@'$J,>&="-"\#%& 
Equation 9: Net working capital 
 
Marine Harvest has biological assets which comprises a large share of their 
working capital, as production cycles for salmon varies around 150 days. 
Figure 27 shows an overview of the average amount of days for inventory, 
receivable and payables outstanding, combined also known as the cash 
conversion cycle. 
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MHG’s inventory mainly comprise of feed, goods in progress, packaging 
materials and finished goods (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). The average days 
of storage for inventory has been relatively stable around 20 days historically, 
but higher in recent years and in 2008 during the financial crisis. The reason 
for the increase is a relatively high increase in storage of inventory relative to 
sales (ibid).  
 
Accounts receivable show the same trend with relative stable levels around 
45 days, except in 2008 and the two last years where the average amount of 
days with outstanding receivables are considerably higher. The likely reason 
for this is increased payment deadlines to customers. Nevertheless, the bad 
debt to accounts receivables ratio has been stable around 1% between 2008 
and 2014. This is an indication the the company expect 1% of accounts 
receivables to default each year. The constant ratio of 1% is a good sign that 
MHG has clients with stable economic conditions and that MHG has been 
persistent in its assessment of the customer base’s ability to pay.  
 
Days payable outstanding shows the same trend as days of inventory 
outstanding and days of receivables outstanding. It is worth noticing that the 
days of payables outstanding significantly exceeds the days of inventory and 
receivables outstanding. This reduces the time period that capital is tied up 
in operations, given by the cash conversion cycle (CCC) (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2014): 
 /// = B"->&+JO%J,'9-&'$,>,"JM+JQ +&B"->&9%@%+O"\#%>&'$,>,"JM+JQ − B"->&="-"\#%>&'$,>,"JM+JQ& 
Equation 10: Cash conversion cycle calculation 
      
 
Still MHG has considerable amounts of capital tied up in their biological 
assets and their cash conversion cycle is therefore considered to be long.   
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Figure 27: The cash conversion cycle has been relatively stable historically. 
 
Last, cash included in working capital is cash that is related to operations. 
Table 8 exhibit the procedure to retrieve the cash value related to MHG’s 
operations. First the cash-to-sales ratio is calculated for MHG and compared 
to the lower quartile and upper quartile of the cash-to-sales ratio of its peers. 
Further, it is assumed that the cash actually required by operations is 
represented by the lower quartile. The results are displayed as required 
liquid funds, which deviate from MHG’s cash-to-sales ratio every year except 
2010 were MHG represent the lower quartile among its peers. The required 
funds for operations is then calculated by multiplying sales with the lower-
quartile cash-to sales ratio. The excess cash is the difference between 
MHG’s cash balance and the required funds for operations.  
 
' Estimating'required'liquidity'for'operations'All'figures'in'billions' 2010' 2011' 2012' 2013' 2014'
Liquid'funds'
$ $ $ $ $Cash$ 319$$ 279$$ 335$$ 606$$ 1$195$$
Assets$held$for$sale$ 0$ 0$ 0$ 1$059$ 19$
Short$term$liquids$ 319$ 279$ 335$ 1$665$ 1$214$
Sales$ 15$281$ 15$757$ 15$420$ 19$177$ 25$300$
Liquid$funds$to$sales$MHG$ 2.1$%$ 1.8$%$ 2.2$%$ 8.7$%$ 4.8$%$
Lower$quartile$ratios$ 2.1$%$ 1.3$%$ 1.3$%$ 6.8$%$ 4.7$%$
Median$ratios$ 3.1$%$ 1.8$%$ 2.2$%$ 7.3$%$ 5.4$%$
Upper$quartile$ratios$ 5.9$%$ 7.5$%$ 11.7$%$ 8.1$%$ 10.8$%$
Required$liquid$funds$ 2.1$%$ 1.3$%$ 1.3$%$ 6.8$%$ 4.7$%$
Liquid$funds$ 319$ 279$ 335$ 1$665$ 1$214$
Required$liquid$funds$for$operations$ 319$ 203$ 208$ 1$308$ 1$195$
Excess$liquid$funds$(Financial$Assets)$ 0$ 76$ 127$ 358$ 19$
Table 8: Required liquid funds for operations is estimated to be equal to the average of the 
lowest quartile of liquid funds in the industry. 
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9.7 CAPITALIZATION OF OPERATING LEASES  
A company can either own or lease its PP&E. Even if the company has 
chosen to lease, the PP&E will be considered to be economically beneficial 
the leaseholder as is likely essential for the operations. Therefore. I will use 
this approach to be able to recognize the value of leased items on the 
balance sheet and present an adjusted balance sheet that more accurately 
reflects MHG’s operational assets.  
 
In the notes of the 2014 annual report, MHG’s operating lease commitments 
are presented with maturities from less than one year to more than 5 years 
(Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). To calculate the appropriate length of the 
operating leases of more than five years, I used the average lease 
commitment from each of the previous years as an approximation. A fair 
value of the leased asset would be the PV of the operating lease commitment 
discounted with MHG’s cost of debt. For FY’14 this adds NOK 1.54B to 
MHG’s PP&E, which is an addition of 21.2% to the existing net PP&E – a quite 
significant adjustment.  
 
$Operating$Leases$ 2008$ 2009$ 2010$ 2011$ 2012$ 2013$ 2014$
Within$one$year$ 30$ 30$ 28$ 410$ 308$ 402$ 605$
1M5$years$ 77$ 61$ 51$ 507$ 444$ 599$ 745$
More$than$five$years$ 69$ 60$ 69$ 72$ 82$ 57$ 58$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Cost$of$debt$ 2.89% 2.89% 2.89% 2.89% 2.89% $2.89% 2.89%
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Average$payments$in$year$1M5$ 19 15 13 127 111 150 186
Estimated$length$of$op.$Leases$(years)$ 9$ 9$ 10$ 6$ 6$ 5$ 5$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $PV$of$operating$lease$commitments$ 616 552 683 1$217 1$123 1$206 1$537
Table 9: Operating leases contribute a considerable amount to the balance sheet.  
9.8 REFORMULATED BALANCE SHEET 
All$figures$in$billions$ Operating$assets$
Line$items$ 2010$ 2011$ 2012$ 2013$ 2014$
Trade$receivable$ 1$845$ 1$915$ 1$782$ 3$191$ 3$360$
Cash$needed$for$operations*$ 319$ 203$ 208$ 1$308$ 1$195$
Inventories$ 776$ 783$ 820$ 1$751$ 2$401$
Biological$assets$ 7$278$ 6$285$ 6$104$ 9$537$ 9$914$
Other$current$assets$ 815$ 610$ 593$ 1$097$ 1$111$
Net$PP&E$ 3$885$ 4$168$ 4$112$ 6$677$ 7$235$
Licenses$ 5$443$ 5$578$ 5$435$ 6$036$ 6$514$
Intangible$Assets$+$Goodwill$ 2$245$ 2$269$ 2$230$ 2$563$ 2$583$
Deferred$tax$asset$ 119$ 160$ 74$ 179$ 147$
Other$assets$ 3$ 26$ 73$ 9$ 15$
Capitalization$of$operating$leases$ 683$ 1$217$ 1$123$ 1$206$ 1$537$
$ $ $ $ $ $
Total$operating$assets$ 23$409$ 23$213$ 22$553$ 33$553$ 36$012$
$ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $
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$$ Operating$Liabilities$
Trade$payables$ 1$450$ 1$482$ 1$453$ 2$233$ 2$039$
Current$tax$liabilities$ 50$ 87$ 26$ 253$ 525$
Other$current$liabilitiesMDividends$ 1$112$ 1$180$ 1$475$ 1$968$ 3$112$
Deferred$tax$liability$ 2$238$ 2$352$ 2$544$ 3$365$ 3$569$
Other$liabilities$ 571$ 99$ 415$ 976$ 2$334$
$$
$ $ $ $ $Total$operating$liabilities$ 5$421 5$200 5$913 8$794 11$580
$$
$ $ $ $ $Net$operating$assets$ 17$988 18$013 16$641 24$759 24$432
$$
$ $ $ $ $Net$operating$assets$ 17$988 18$013 16$641 24$759 24$432
Table 10: Operational assets and liabilities 
$$ Financial$assets$
Line$items$ 2010$ 2011$ 2012$ 2013$ 2014$
Excess$liquid$funds*$ 0$ 76$ 127$ 358$ 19$
Investments$in$associated$companies$ 679$ 624$ 647$ 900$ 1$022$
Other$shares$ 124$ 92$ 1$009$ 132$ 166$
$$
$ $ $ $
$$
Total$financial$assets$ 803 793 1$783 1$390 1$207$
$$
$ $ $ $
$$
$$ Financial$debt$
Current$position$of$LT&ST$Debt$ 430$ 157$ 378$ 687$ 7$
Long$term$debt$ 5$107$ 6$589$ 5$339$ 7$710$ 10$669$
Liabilities$held$for$sale$ 0$ 0$ 0$ 190,5$ 0$
$$
$ $ $ $ $Total$financial$debt$ 5$537 6$746 5$716 8$587 10$676
$$
$ $ $ $ $Net$financial$debt$ 4$734 5$954 3$933 7$197 9$469
(+)$Equity$ 12$571$ 10$842$ 11$689$ 16$346$ 14$718$
(+)$Equity$increase$from$capitalization$ 683$ 1$217$ 1$123$ 1$206$ 1$537$
Net$capital$ 17$304$ 16$796$ 15$622$ 23$543$ 24$187$
Table 11: Financial assets and liabilities 
Table 10 and 11 gives an overview of the reformulated balance sheet, where 
MHG’s assets and liabilities are divided into operational and financial 
character based on the discussion above. The reformulated balance sheet 
provides a more accurate image of the assets driving the core operational 
activities, hence the enterprise value of the company. It will also allow to 
calculate a more precise return on asset (ROA) that is applicable to the 
operations of MHG, not disturbed by non-operational items. 
 72 
10. DRIVER ASSUMPTIONS 
This section addresses estimates for the future harvest volume, salmon price 
and operational costs, which draws on the strategic analysis. The results will 
ultimately make up the future gross profit forecast that will be critical to the 
estimation of the free cashflow used in the WACC model. 
10.1 OPERATING REVENUE   
10.1.1 Volume Analysis  
The graph in figure 28 gives an overview of the historical harvest volumes 
(tons) in the different regions. The CAGR in harvested volumes is positive in 
all regions, except Chile and Canada. The harvested volumes in Norway, 
Scotland and Ireland and Faroes show significant growth with a CAGR of 7%, 
7% and 6% respectively, while the CAGR between 2008 and 2014 has been 
negative for Chile and Canada (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
Figure 28: MHG harvested volume has been increasing in most of the regions they are operating 
historically (ibid) 
The reason for the declining harvest volumes in Chile is the Panaceas 
Disease in 2008/2009, which caused the mortality rates to soar and led to 
downscaling of operations. Nevertheless, the volumes in Chile has increased 
in recent years and was in 2014 almost as high as the 2008 level. In addition, 
it is reasonable to assume that the volumes will increase further as MHG 
acquired the entire region XI in Chile and merged with AquaChile at the 
beginning of 2015. MHG will own 42.8% of the new entity, with an option to 
acquire up to a minimum of 55% after June 15, 2016. Both these events are 
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likely to stabilize and increase the harvest volumes MHG can expect to 
achieve in Chile (ibid).  
 
The decrease in Canada in the period between 2008 and 2014 is more 
significant in percentage than the decrease in Chile. The harvested volumes 
have been relatively stable all years, except in 2014 where the volumes were 
significantly reduced. The reduction in 2014 was due to reduced smolt 
stocking in 2012 and the outbreak of the Kudoa decease in 2014, which 
caused high mortality and hence a decrease in harvest volumes (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015). The harvested volume in Canada will most likely stay 
low in the immediate future because of the Kudoa disease, which in 
consensus with analyst estimates (Pareto Securities, 2015).        
 
Overall, MHG has had positive CAGR of 4.2% in harvest volumes across all 
regions in the period between 2008 and 2014. In addition, the harvest 
volumes are likely to increase in the immediate years as biological assets has 
increased in from 2012 through 2014. Still, the growth in biological assets 
these years are lower than previous years, indication that the harvested 
volumes will increase, but at a lower growth rate.   
 
The Norwegian salmon farming output will soon reach its regulatory limits 
(MAB) and this will further enhance the assumption that volume growth will 
not be as strong as it has been in recent years. This limit is however 
expected to be raised in the future. The overview in figure 29 shows how the 
industry in Norway has been climbing towards it’s the roof of which outputs 
that are allowed in Norway. 
    
 
Figure 29: The total production volumes of salmon in Norway is reaching towards the maximum 
allowed biomass, which make additional volumes dependent on licenses (Marine Harvest ASA, 
2015) 
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Given the slightly lower increase in biological assets in recent years and that 
the biological roof in Norway is approaching, the future growth rate in harvest 
volumes is expected to be lower than the double digit growth experienced 
historically in the most immediate years. This is in line with consensus from 
analysts. In addition, the volume growth is expected to be more stable than 
the historically volatile growth rates, partly due to the increased efforts in 
R&D targeted to combat fish deceases and sea lice.  
 
The regulations do effectively put a cap on industry growth, and will thus also 
limit the organic growth opportunities of MHG. Therefore, parts of MHG’s 
forecasted growth will come through mergers and acquisitions as a part of 
the ongoing consolidation trend in the salmon farming sector. As a result, 
MHG’s total volume growth will still be positive, but in the low single digit 
range. This assumes that the ownership limitations of 25% that was 
discussed in section 5.1.1.1 will be eased to allow MHG to hold a larger 
share of the harvest volumes in Norway. The volume growth in 2018 and 
2019 is expected to be 3% p.a., taking the proposed change in regulation 
into account. Further, the relative share of harvest volumes is assumed to 
stay constant for Canada, Scotland, Ireland and the Faroes. The share of 
total harvest volumes in Chile is on the other hand estimated to increase after 
2018 as a result of increased production capacity due to the merge with 
AquaChile and the recovery from a period suffering from unfavorable health 
condition for Chilean salmon. 
 
The estimated harvest volumes for each region is presented in the table 12 
below. The volumes are in line with analyst estimates from Pareto and SEB 
(SEB, 2015) (Pareto Securities, 2015).  
 
$
2015$ 2016$ 2017$ 2018$ 2019$
Norway$ 257$ 265$ 276$ 284$ 293$
Chile$ 64$ 64$ 56$ 62$ 68$
Canada$ 40$ 42$ 44$ 46$ 48$
Scotland$ 52$ 56$ 59$ 61$ 64$
Ireland$$ 10$ 10$ 10$ 11$ 11$
Faroes$ 2$ 12$ 8$ 9$ 9$
Total' 425' 449' 453' 472' 493'
Table 12: MHG’s volumes are expected to increase in all regions in the future, but at a lower and 
more stable growth rate than earlier 
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10.1.2 Price Analysis  
The price of salmon is largely dependent on supply and demand. If there is 
shortage of salmon in the market the price is likely to increase. There are 
several factors that can contribute to shortage of salmon in the market. 
Salmon lice and fish diseases increase the mortality rate, which ultimately 
decrease the harvest volumes. Storms and force majeure events also 
increase the mortality rate and escapes from fish cages. The licenses 
schemes may limit the production and could also causing shortage in supply 
to the market. On the other hand, if there is larger supply than demand the 
price is likely to decrease as salmon is a fresh good and therefore has to be 
sold within days after harvesting. Reasons for decreased demand may be 
because of declining prices on competitive products or trade sanctions, to 
mention some.  
 
Diseases, lice, storms, force majeure and temperature can also effect the 
quality of the salmon and hence the price a supplier can expect to achieve.  
In addition, the globalization of the market for salmon also determines the 
price to a large extent as buyers can easily change their supplier if the 
current prices they are facing is not competitive to other global players. 
Buyers can also enter into forward contracts, which means that the price is 
set and implies a loss if the market price for salmon exceeds the forward 
price and a gain if the market price is less than the forward price.          
 
To be able to estimate the future prices for salmon it is appropriate to take 
market expectation into consideration. Future contracts on salmon gives an 
indication of the market expectations on the likely development of the salmon 
price, which is presented in figure 30.  
 
The prices for forward contracts on salmon indicates that the price of salmon 
is going to increase throughout 2015 until the turn of the year were the 
forward prices declines. Further, the prices on forward contracts gradually 
declines with delivery through 2016, before they stabilize at 38.20 NOK/kg 
with delivery halfway into 2017 (Index Mundi, 2015). 
 
Prices estimated by Arctic is slightly lower than the futures prices and is 
estimated to be 39.00 NOK/kg for the remaining of 2015, 40.00 NOK/kg for 
FY/16 and FY/17. SEB expect slightly higher prices than Arctic of 40.20 
NOK/kg for the remaining of 2015, 42 NOK/kg for 2016 and 2017.  
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Figure 30: The futures price for salmon can indicates that the price is expected to increase in the 
near future and then fall slightly (Index Mundi, 2015). 
 
The prices used to estimate future sales are given in the table 13 below 
which is in between the estimates from Arctic and SEB. The prices beyond 
2017 is slightly above the forward price, but is supported by the moderate 
supply growth, the weaker NOK/EUR and NOK/USD exchange ratios and 
prospects for a healthy demand trend discussed in the macro and industry 
analysis.  
   
2 2015$ 2016$ 2017$ 2018$ 2019$NOK/kg$ 40.97$ 41.8$ 42$ 42$ 42$
Table 13: The estimated price is expected to increase in the two following years before 
stabilizing at NOK 42 in 2017. 
 
10.2 OPERATIONAL DIRECT COSTS  
10.2.1 Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) 
Figure 31 shows the development in COGS relative to sales. The COGS-to-
sales ratio has been relatively volatile in the period between 2008 and 2014. 
Deviations in the COGS-to-sales ratio mostly arise from changes in input 
prices for feed, prices for smolt and in costs related to fish health (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015). 
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Figure 31: COGS to sales ratio has been relatively stable higher ratios are often caused by 
mortality and escapes 
 
Accounting principles require the cost of goods sold to be expensed in the 
same period as the goods are sold, in the mean time the cost of goods are 
capitalized as biological assets discussed earlier. Therefore, the levels of 
biological assets give an indication on the amount of COGS in future years. 
However, salmons with a weight exceeding 1 kg is valued as biological 
assets at their estimated value, not only their cost of production. Hence, 
using biological assets to estimate future COGS has to be done with caution. 
Further, sales are assumed to be a good driver for COGS as both posts are 
expensed in the same period. The overview in table 2 in the chapter 2.3.6 
exhibit the main cost components in the production of salmon and their 
relative importance. The feed cost is the most significant, comprising ~60% 
of total COGS on average in the historical period from 2008 to 2014. The feed 
cost also comprises a large share of total operational cost and differs in the 
different regions ranging from 48% in Norway to 41% in Chile (Marine 
Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
Since the feed cost comprise such a large share of total COGS, it is 
appropriate to conduct an analysis on the likely future prices of main 
ingredients in feed production. An overview of the historical price 
development in feed ingredients was provided in figure 11 in section 6.2. In 
the following paragraphs I will elaborate on the historical trend and the likely 
future price development of salmon feed ingredients.      
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Fish Oil – have steadily increased since 2009. In 2014 the average price of 
fish oil was approximately USD 2,300 per ton which has dropped in 2015 
(Index Mundi, 2015).    
 
Rapeseed Oil – and fish oil has had a correlating price development up until 
2011 were the price of rapeseed oil started to decrease. In 2015 the price for 
rapeseed oil has been relatively volatile and decreased from 2014 levels. 
Futures contracts on rapeseed oil with maturity in December 2017 is trading 
475 USD/ton, which indicates a slightly increase in future prices (Index 
Mundi, 2015).    
 
Fish Meal – has had an increasing trend in price historically. Also, the price 
of fish meal has been higher than fish oil on average, however in recent years 
the prices have been more or less the same. The price has decreased 
significantly in 2015 from 2014 levels and is trading for 1,650 USD/ton (Index 
Mundi, 2015).    
 
Soya – and corn have traditionally been a very important ingredient in fish 
feed. Today the demand from China is increasing faster than the production 
of soy and more corn is used for energy purposes. At the same time, a 
generic modified production of soy and corn has been developed, which has 
been sold at a premium. In 2014 the average price for soy and corn was 
USD 670 per ton. However, the futures prices for soy meal has decreased 
heavily throughout 2015 to 342 USD/ton, and is expected to decrease more 
in immediate years. The futures price for a contract with delivery in 
December 2017 is prices at 297 USD/ton today indicates this trend (Index 
Mundi, 2015). 
 
Wheat – has generally enjoyed healthy production and balanced 
supply/demand, which is reflected in a rather stable price. The price for 
wheat has however heavily decreased in 2015. Still, the futures are trading 
for significantly higher values indication that the prices for wheat is likely to 
pick up to the stable historical levels. The future price of a wheat contract 
with maturity in December 2017 is trading for 545 USD/tons, which supports 
this view (Index Mundi, 2015). 
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Vegetable oils and vegetable meal comprise the major ingredients in salmon 
feed and since the futures prices show the opposite development in the 
prices, where the latter is expected to decrease and the first is expected to 
increase it is difficult to draw a single conclusion on the likely development of 
feed cost. In addition, the Norwegian currency has weakened compared to 
the USD and EUR, and the unfavorable currency effect might offset the 
decline in ingredients prices. It is hard to predict both the commodity prices 
and the currency exchange rates on long-term, but regardless of how these 
will develop, the development of MHG’s own production plants will most 
likely decrease the feed cost as MHG avoids the “cost plus” contracts used 
by feed suppliers, all else equal. 
 
'' '' '' 2014' 2015' 2016' 2017' 2018' 2019'
Feed$cost$
$  
12.00$kr/kg$ 11.93$kr/kg$ 11.85$kr/kg$ 11.78$kr/kg$ 11.70$kr/kg$ 11.63$kr/kg$
Table 14: Feed cost per kg is assumed to decline slightly as MHG's own feed production will 
make the company increasingly self-sufficient 
     
The deviations in the COGS-to-sales ratio discussed initially is assumed to be 
normal for the salmon farming industry. Since the input prices have been 
volatile historically, I believe that 2014 feed cost per kg is most appropriate to 
estimate future levels of feed cost.  
 
Other cost included in cost of sales is primary processing, smolt and 
mortality. Restructuring cost, salary and personnel expenses and other 
operating expenses was discussed in chapter 8 and are all based on 
historical average levels. The COGS not associated with feed cost has 
historically constituted 40% of total COGS, leaving 60% of total COGS to be 
feed cost. This is assumed to persist, and the impact from deviations from 
the historical average will be further discussed in section 15.  
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11. MORPOL, FEED AND MH VAP EUROPE 
This chapter presents MHG’s secondary processed salmon segment and 
historical accounting figures in order to estimate the segments contribution to 
the income statement in the forecast period.     
 
MHG is also involved in the market for secondary processed salmon, which 
include filleting, fillet trimming, portioning, different cuttings, smoking, making 
ready meals or packaging with Modified Atmosphere (MAP). The secondary 
products are called value-added product (VAP). Fish dominates the market 
for processed aquaculture products in Europe, with a share of 66%. The 
industry is extremely fragmented with more than 4,000 companies which are 
fairly small, however MHG is amongst the largest in the industry. The largest 
players in the industry mostly produce smoked salmon and it is expected 
that the market will experience more demand as convenience food (ready-to-
cook) and packaging that increase the durability of the product has become 
increasingly popular (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015).  
 
After the acquisition of Morpol in 2013, MHG became the largest producer of 
smoked salmon. In the following year, MHG restructured its VAP operations 
by reducing the number of plants from 13 to 8 in order to concentrate 
production in fewer, but more efficient entities. They also combined all VAP 
entities to a singe entity called Marine Harvest Consumer Products as a part 
of their strategy to become vertically integrated (Marine Harvest ASA, 2015). 
The revenues of the VAP segment is highly dependent on the demand in 
France and Germany, which comprise 47% of the total demand for smoked 
salmon. In addition, most of the total demand is by European countries, as 
the UK, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, the Benelux countries and Spain 
comprise 43% of the total demand. The Historical and expected GDP per 
capita in France, Germany and the Euro area is exhibit in figure 32, where 
the GDP per capita is expected to grow in all areas (Marine Harvest ASA, 
2015). The OECD expect economic growth of 1.3% in 2016 and 1.6% in 2017 
in France as a result of lower oil prices, less fiscal contraction and to the 
effects of sustained monetary stimulus. In addition, they estimate that the 
wages are likely increase, however they predict that unemployment will only 
decline slightly as weak business confidence hinders investment (OECD, 
2015). OECD expect economic growth to strengthen in Germany going 
forward because of a robust labor market, low interest rates and low oil 
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prices are likely to increase private consumption. Further they expect the 
lower demand in emerging markets to be offset by increased demand from 
other European countries whose economy are expected to strengthen 
(OECD, 2015).               
 
 
Figure 32: GDP per capita of VAP main markets (Knoema, 2015) 
 
The positive growth prospect of the economic conditions in Europe is likely to 
increase the expansive growth seen in most of the entities in the processing 
segment historically. In addition, the restructuring which took place is likely to 
decrease the high cost in the segment which caused a negative EBIT in MH 
VAP Europe in 2014.   
 
MHG’s processing of feed industry is kept separate from it farming industry 
and therefore has to be valued separately. The information about the revenue 
and cost associated with the processing and feed industry is very limited, 
where only revenues, EBITDA and EBIT is included in the notes under 
segment summary in the annual report.  
 
To compute the COGS and SG&A for the processing and feed segment, the 
historical average of total SG&A and COGS relative to the accumulated cost 
of SG&A and COGS is used to estimate future levels. The result is a historical 
average COGS ratio of ~67% and SG&A ratio of ~33% to accumulated 
SG&A and COGS. The estimated historical COGS and SG&A for the 
processing and feed segment is then calculated by multiplying the difference 
between revenue and EBITDA given in the notes in the annual report with the 
respective ratios. Further, the growth in revenue of each segment is based 
on their CAGR in the period between 2008 and 2014, which is ~13% for MH 
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Markets, ~5% for MH VAP Europe, ~13% for Morpol and ~38% in other 
markets. Since the feed segment has only been operating for 1 year, it is not 
possible to calculate a CAGR, the growth is therefore based on expectations 
by Marine Harvest outlined in the annual report of ~5% (Marine Harvest ASA, 
2015). The future EBITDA is calculated based on the average EBITDA 
margin to be able to retrieve future levels of COGS and SG&A, which is the 
difference between future sales and EBITDA multiplied by 67% and 33% 
respectively.  
 
The historical and estimated accumulated Sales, COGS, SG&A EBITDA of 
the processing and feed segments is presented in table 15, which shows an 
increasing development in EBITDA in the future, which is consistent with the 
historical development.     
 
$
2008A' 2009A' 2010A' 2011A' 2012A' 2013A' 2014A' 2015E' 2016E' 2017E' 2018E' 2019E'
Revenue$ 4$509$ 4$494$ 4$239$ 4$111$ 4$512$ 5$577$ 8$244$ 9$216$ 10$320$ 11$574$ 13$004$ 14$638$
COGS$ 2$931$ 2$922$ 2$756$ 2$673$ 2$933$ 3$626$ 5$360$ 5$996$ 6$718$ 7$542$ 8$484$ 9$564$
SG&A$ 1$434$ 1$429$ 1$348$ 1$308$ 1$435$ 1$774$ 2$622$ 2$933$ 3$287$ 3$690$ 4$151$ 4$679$
EBITDA$ 143$ 143$ 135$ 131$ 143$ 177$ 262$ 287$ 314$ 342$ 369$ 395$
Table 15: The estimated EBITDA of VAP markets in based on the historical increasing 
development 
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12. COST OF CAPITAL 
In section 3 I established that the WACC method is the most appropriate to 
use to calculate the enterprise value of MHG. In this methodology the WACC 
is used to discount the free cash flow. Value of the firm is obtained by 
discounting expected cash flows to the firm to both debt and equity owners 
(Damodaran 2012), given by equation 11: 
 
)! = & 0/011 +;<// 1 + 0/07 1 + Q;<// − Q1 +;<// 7F168  
Equation 11: Enterprise value of the levered firm 
 
where the n is the last year in the forecasting period, hence 2019, and g is 
the long term growth rate.  The second part in the equation represents the 
terminal value, which is the present value of cash flows generated after 2019. 
The long-term growth rate should not exceed the overall growth in the 
economy. The reason for this is that the companies will eventually be 
unrealistically large relative to the aggregate economy (Koller, Goedhart, & 
Wessels, 2010) This will be further discussed in section 13. 
 
The following sections presents the methodology for calculating the cost of 
capital and results obtained for MHG. The sections comprise the 
methodology and results of the calculation of cost of equity and followed by 
the methodology of the calculation of cost of debt. The cost of equity will be 
calculated using the CAPM methodology and the chapter therefore contains 
estimates of the risk-free rate, beta and market risk premium.  
 
Cost'of'equity'calculations'
'
WACC'calculations'
Market$premium$ 5.4$%$
$
Cost$of$debt$ 2.89$%$
Risk$free$rate$ 1.82$%$
$
Cost$of$equity$ 6.16$%$
Smoothed$Unlevered$Beta$ $0.66$$
$
Debt$ratio$ 31.3%$
Smoothed$Levered$Beta$ $0.80$$
$
Equity$ratio$ 68.7%$
Unlevered$Cost$of$Equity$ 5.36$%$
$
Effective$tax$rate$ 27$%$
Levered$Cost$of$Equity$ 6.16$%$
$
WACC' 4.89'%'
Table 16: Calculation of cost of equity and weighted average cost of capital 
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12.1 COST OF EQUITY 
Actual return can be very different from expected returns that gives a source 
of risk. There are two types of risk; systematic and unsystematic risk. 
Systematic risk, or market risk, is risk arising from market wide risk sources. 
Characteristics for market risk is that it cannot be diversified away and affect 
many, if not all, investments in varying degree. Unsystematic risk, or firm-
specific risk, is risk that arise from risk factors specific for a firm. 
Characteristics for firm-specific risk is that it can be diversified away 
(Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2010) 
 
Most risk- and return models agree on that risk comes from distributions of 
actual returns around the expected return and that risk should be measured 
based on a marginal investor who is well diversified. However, the different 
models vary in the way the non-diversifiable market risk is measured. 
 
The risk and return model that is used the most and has been in use the 
longest is the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM. This model assumes that 
there is no transaction cost, that everyone has access to the same 
information, consequently investors can keep diversifying without additional 
cost. In the CAPM world all investor therefore holds different combination of 
the riskless asset and the market portfolio relative to their risk preferences. 
There are two additional assumptions in the CAPM model. The first is that a 
riskless asset exists, and the second is that investors can borrow and lend at 
the same riskless asset to arrive at their optimal allocation (Damodaran, 
Investment Valuation, 2012).  
 
The CAPM measure the cost of equity given by equation 12; 
 /<C_ = [` + T )W − [`  
Equation 12: Cost of equity by the capital asset pricing model 
 
where Rf is the risk free rate, β is the stock beta and (Er – Rf) is the market 
premium. The beta is the risk of a company’s investments relative to the 
market. The beta calculation is presented in section 12.1.2.   
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12.1.1 Risk-Free Rate 
There are certain requirements for an asset to be considered risk free. One is 
that the asset must have no risk of default. The only securities that has a 
chance of being risk free is government securities, because the government 
control the printing of currency. Further the expected return has to be know 
with certainty, hence the actual return is equal to the expected return. If this 
prerequisite is to be redeemed, there cannot be any reinvestment risk. The 
bond should also have a duration that matches the duration of the cash flows 
of MHG to the furthest extent possible (Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 
2012). Consequently, a 10-year Norwegian government zero-coupon bond is 
used as a proxy for the risk-free rate. A potential pitfall is that the 10-year 
bond could be priced with a liquidity premium and a premium for inflation 
risk, which would not make it fully risk-free. Nonetheless, it is the closest 
proxy available, and is consistent with the approach described by Brealey, 
Myers & Allen (2012) and most frequent used by the market (PWC, 2014). 
 
Since the beta is measured based on prices June 23, 2015, it is most 
consistent to use listings of a 10-year zero-coupon bond at this date in the 
CAPM to be consistent. Especially considering the stable key interest rate 
throughout 2015, seen in figure 33. 
 
 
Figure 33: Development in 3-y, 5-y and 10-y government bonds has been decreasing ever since 
the financial crisis (Norges Bank, 2015) 
 
The decreasing trend in interest rates for government bonds since 2008 is 
likely to continue for the future. The December 17, 2015 the Norwegian 
National Bank presented their estimates for the key interest rate, which is 
unchanged from the current level of 0.75%. This supports the stable 
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development in the interest rates in governmental bonds during 2015 and 
solidify the assumption of using the historically low interest for 10-y 
governmental bonds as a proxy for the risk free rate going forward.       
 
12.1.2 Beta  
Since all invertors hold the market portfolio, the risk to an investor of an 
individual asset will be the additional risk the individual asset add to the 
market portfolio. The additional risk is measured by beta, which is given by 
the following formula (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2010); 
 Ta = &/'O"9+"J@%&'(&">>%,&+&b+,ℎ&_"94%,&C'9,('#+'!"9+"J@%&'(&,ℎ%&_"94%,&C'9,('#+' = /'Oacdce  
Equation 13: Beta of an asset i 
 
As the market have a beta value of 1 asset that are riskier than average have 
a beta value greater than 1, while assets that are less risky than average 
have a beta less than 1. A riskless asset has a beta value of 0 (Brealey, 
Myers, & Allen, 2010).   
 
To measure the beta, I first calculated the beta for MHG and its peers by 
regressing the weekly return of stock prices against the weekly return of the 
market, using two years of weekly historical data of stock prices and the Oslo 
Stock Exchange index collected from Yahoo Finance (Yahoo , 2015). The 
results for MHG are shown in figure 34. I used MHG peers to retrieve an 
average unlevered beta, as stocks tend to move towards industry averages. 
To eliminate the effect of differences in financing of peers3, I unlevered all 
betas and calculated the average unlevered beta, which I re-levered by 
MHG’s leverage ratio. This method of calculating the leveraged beta 
considers the tendency of betas within the same industry to converge. 
Further the beta is adjusted by the Bloomberg method by multiplying the raw 
beta by 2/3 and adding 1/3, as betas tend to converge towards the market 
beta of 1 (Damodaran, 2012).  
 
                                            
3 The historical prices for peers is also retrieved from Yahoo Finance and the information 
about their financial structure from the BvD Zephyr database. 
 87 
 
Figure 34: Beta regression of OSEBX and MHG.OL weekly return 
 
Form the graph presented above one can see the distributions of MHG 
returns over market returns. The distributions over market return has varied 
considerably, which can be seen from the relatively low R2 coefficient, which 
indicate that changes in market returns are not much related to changes in 
MHG returns. The most likely explanation for this low relation is that the index 
is highly sensitive to oil price fluctuations, while this is not the case for MHG.   
 
The choice of using the Oslo Stock Exchange as index is made to be 
consistent with the choice of peers. MHG and all peers used in the beta 
calculation is Norwegian companies, with the majority of their operations in 
Norway. Therefore, I believe a Norwegian index is most suitable even though 
Marine Harvest is also listed on NYSE and have international operations.   
 
The choice of using weekly data from the last two years is because of the 
Morpol acquisition in early 2013. The stock prices can fluctuate widely during 
an acquisition and not reflect the actual operations of the firm and I therefore 
believe the returns earned in MHG after 2013 is more representative to 
measure the risk.   
 
Manual'calculations'vs'OSEBX'index' $$ $$ $$ $$
$
MHG' LERØY' SALMAR' BAKKAFROST' GRIEG'
Covariance$ $0.0006$$ $0.0004$$ $0.0005$$ $0.0002$$ $0.0005$$
Market$variance$ $0.0006$$ $0.0006$$ $0.0006$$ $0.0006$$ $0.0006$$
Beta'formula' '0.991'' '0.710'' '0.882'' '0.396'' '0.860''
$ $ $ $ $ $Slope' '0.991'' '0.488'' '0.659'' '0.322'' '0.343''
$ $ $ $ $ $Net$debt$ $21$061 $ $5$418 $ $4$820 $ $934 $ $12$140 $
Market$cap$diluted$ $46$269$$ $15$937$$ $15$069$$ $12$410$$ $3$082$$
Leverage$ratio$ 46$%$ 34$%$ 32$%$ 8$%$ 394$%$
Unlevered'beta' '0.68'' '0.53'' '0.67'' '0.37'' '0.17''
$ $ $ $ $ $Median$asset$beta$ $0.53 $
$ $ $ $Average$asset$beta$ $0.48$$
$ $ $ $$ $ $ $ $ $MHG'levered'beta' '0.70''
' $ $ $Smoothed'MHG'levered'beta' 0.80'
' $ $ $' '
' ' ' $ $ $
' ' ' $ $ $
' ' ' $ $ $
' ' ' $ $ $
y2=20,991x2+20,0014R²2=20,22763
^20,0%
^10,0%
0,0%
10,0%
20,0%
^15,0% ^10,0% ^5,0% 0,0% 5,0% 10,0%
MHG.OL'weekly'return
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$ $ $ $ $ $Leverage' $ $ $ $ $
$
MHG' LERØY' SALMAR' BAKKAFROST' GRIEG'
Net$debt/Total$Equity$ 46$%$ 34$%$ 32$%$ 8$%$ 394$%$
Net$debt/Total$Capital$ 57$%$ 36$%$ 48$%$ 27$%$ 80$%$
Net$debt$ 21$061$ 5$418$ 4$820$ 934$ 12$140$
Market$Cap$ 46$269$ 15$937$ 15$069$ 12$410$ 3$082$
Total$capital$ 36$974$ 14$858$ 10$124$ 3$463$ 15$222$
Table 17: The smoothed leveraged beta is 0.8 which is consistent with analyst estimates 
The calculations give a smoothed beta of 0.8 which is a consensus among 
analyst estimates. Considering that the food industry is generally less 
affected by economic situations than other industries I believe the beta is 
sufficient.    
 
12.1.3 Market Risk Premium 
The market risk premium (MRP) measures what an investor demand over and 
above the risk-free rate for investing in equities as a class. The estimate 
depends on two factors; the risk aversion of investors and the perceived risk 
of equity an an investment class. There are three ways to measure the market 
risk premium. The first is to measure the MRP based on surveys of investors, 
were MRP is estimated to be the average of all desired risk premiums by the 
investors in the survey. The second is to base the future market risk premium 
on historical estimates of the risk premium. The last is to estimate an implied, 
forward looking, premium in today’s assets prices. The limitation of the first 
approach is that the investors do not assure any constraints on reasonability, 
the estimates are often very volatile and short-term. The historical estimates 
are sensitive to time periods, whether government bonds or bills are used as 
the risk-free rate and whether geometric or arithmetic averages are used. 
The general rule here is to use long time periods, consistent use of the risk-
free rate and geometric averages. If the stocks are deemed to be correctly 
priced in the aggregate and it is possible to measure cash flows from buying 
stocks, it is possible to measure an internal rate for return, which subtracted 
by the risk-free rate gives an implied equity risk premium (Damodaran, 
Damodaran Online, 2007).  
 
The associated problems with using a market risk premium based on 
historical figures and using surveys of investors suggest using an implied 
market risk premium. According to PWC’s yearly survey on the Norwegian 
market risk premium from 2014 the implied MRP is 5.4%, which will ultimately 
be used in the WACC calculations (PWC, 2014).  
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12.2 COST OF DEBT 
The return lenders expect to make on their investment includes a premium 
for default risk and that expected return is called cost of debt. The cost of 
debt is determined by the riskless rate, the default risk and the tax advantage 
associated with debt. The cost of debt increase with the default risk, as a 
higher probability of default increase the risk of the firm, which in turn the 
cost of borrowing. The tax rate also determines the cost of debt as interest is 
tax deductible (Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 2012).  
 
I have used three methods to estimate the cost of debt; (i) recent borrowing 
history, (ii) synthetic rating and (iii) the yield for other corporate bonds with 
similar rating. Using the recent borrowing history, one has to look at the firm’s 
recent borrowings and get a sense of the spreads charged to come up with 
the cost of debt. The alternative approach is to estimate a synthetic rating 
based on a firm’s interest coverage ratio. The synthetic rating can then be 
used to estimate the default spread which can be used to measure the cost 
of debt (ibid).  
 
Two approaches have been conducted to estimate MHG’s cost of debt, while 
the third is used to support the first two. One is based on a weighted average 
of MHG’s liabilities and their corresponding interest cost, which is exhibit in 
table 18. The weighted average is a cost of debt of 2.85%.  
 
Interest$rate$ Value$ Weights$ Average$ Description$
3.00'%' $3$773$$ 35$%$ 1.06$%$ NonMcurrent$interest$bearing$debt$
3.00'%' $7$$ 0$%$ 0.00$%$ Current$interest$bearing$debt$
4.62'%' $1$241$$ 12$%$ 0.54$%$ Bond$
2.38'%' $2$267$$ 21$%$ 0.50$%$ EUR$350$mill$2013Mbond$
2.12'%' $2$554$$ 24$%$ 0.51$%$ EUR$375$mill$2014Mbond$
3.00'%' $833$$ 8$%$ 0.23$%$ Other$
LongPterm'debt' '10'675'' 100'%' 2.85'%'
$$$
$ $ $ $Weighted$average$debt$interest$rate$ 2.85$%
$ $ $Adjusted$for$yields$shifting$ 2.80$%$
$ $ $Table 18: Weighted average of MHG liabilities and corresponding interest rate gives a cost of 
debt of 2.8% 
To support the findings in the approach above an approach suggested by 
Damodaran is used. The approach measures the cost of debt using synthetic 
ratings calculated by the interest coverage ratio, exhibit in table 19 and 
further details are available in appendix A.2. The interest coverage ratio for 
MHG suggest a rating of A/A- which is consistent with paying a spread of 
1.15 % above the risk free rate. The result is a cost of debt of 2.97 % which is 
close to the results in the book cost of debt approach. 
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Synthetic$rating$and$interest$spread$ $$
MHG's$implied$rating$is$currently$A/AM$
$Interest$coverage$ratio$ 6.67$
Spread$added$for$A$ 1.00$%$
Spread$added$for$AM$ 1.30$%$
Average$added$spread$added$ 1.15$%$
5yrs$treasury$bonds$ 1.82$%$
Cost'of'debt' 2.97'%'
Table 19: Damodaran's synthetic rating gives a cost of 2.97% 
 
MHG issued bonds have an estimated A/A- rating using Damodaran’s 
synthetic rating approach. Since a significant amount of MHG’s liabilities 
consist of bonds, similar-risk A-rated bonds can be used to estimate their 
cost of debt, by computing the yield to maturity (Benninga, 2008). The yield 
for MHG’s bonds where therefore computed by using the the yield curve for 
A-rated bonds, which is shown in figure 35. Then the extreme outliers were 
removed to find the sane yield for corporate A-rated bonds. Subsequently, a 
third polynomial trend line is computed, which enables computing an 
average yield when the data fluctuates around a curved line. The equation 
for the yield is given by (y) in figure 35. The X in the equation is the weighted 
average maturity of MHG’s bonds which is 3.374 years, shown in table 20. 
The yield obtained when inserting the weighted maturity for MHG’s bonds in 
the equation is 2.43%, which is below the cost of debt calculated using the 
previous approaches.  
 
Only the historic borrowing and synthetic rating approach will be used to 
calculate the cost of debt used in the WACC calculation. The reason for this 
is that the interest coverage ratio gives a rating for MHG in between A- and 
A. Since the bond screeners publicly available4 only provide S&P credit 
rating without separation of +/-, but only A, AA and so on. Therefore, the yield 
calculated using this approach may undervalue MHG’s true cost of debt. In 
addition, the coefficient of determination (R2) is 52.85%, which may be 
caused by different variation in the corporate A-rated bonds – callable and 
convertible bonds is likely to have a different yield that ordinary bonds for 
instance. However, the yield curve confirms that the cost of debt is 
directionally right and therefore supports the results computed in the 
previous two approaches.  
 
                                            
4 Yahoo Finance Bond Screener (Yahoo, 2015)  
 91 
 
Figure 35: Yield curve for corporate A-rated bonds 
Maturity' Years'to'maturity' Value' Weighted'average'maturity'(years)'
2018$ 3$ $1$241$$ 0.614$
2019$ 4$ $2$267$$ 1.496$
2018$ 3$ $2$554$$ 1.264$
$ $
$6$062$$ 3.374$
Table 20: Weighted average maturity of MHG's bonds 
 
The average cost of debt based on the results in the two approaches 
presented above is given in table 21 and suggest that MHG has a cost of 
debt equal to 2.89 %.   
 
Estimation'of'cost'of'debt' ''
Reported$cost$of$debt$ 2.80$%$
Damodaran$approach$ 2.97$%$
Average' 2.89'%'
Table 21: An average of the two approaches gives a cost of debt of 2.89% 
Since it is reasonable to assume that the cost of debt retrieved using the 
MHG real liabilities include a premium for risk of default and the results is 
consistent with the synthetic rate approach. I will not add a premium for risk 
of default. The low cost of debt is supported by a high implied rating and 
generally low interest rates in the economy.   
 
12.2.1 Tax 
Since the interest expense save taxes at the margin, the tax rate that should 
be used to arrive at the after-tax cost of debt is the marginal tax rate. A 
prerequisite for the interest tax benefit is that the firm has income to cover 
their interest expense.      
y2=2^1E^06x3 +26E^06x2 +20.0018x2+20.0182R²2=20.578492
0,000,02
0,040,06
0,080,10
0,120,14
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YTM%
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Damodaran suggests three approaches to deal with different tax rates, 
where two will be elaborated on further. One is to use a weighted average of 
the marginal tax rate in the different regions MHG is operating, shown in 
table 22 (Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 2012). The approach suggests 
using a tax rate of 25.27% for future operations. However, the problem by 
using a weighted average of regional nominal tax rates is that the production 
volumes in the regions is likely to change over time affecting the weights in 
the analysis. Volumes in different regions are for instance determined by the 
access to licenses in different regions. In addition, the tax rate is expected to 
rise considerably I Chile during the next couple of years (KPMG, 2015). 
Since MHG’s operations in Chile are the largest of their international 
operations, the approach is deemed insufficient.        
  
2 Norway$ Chile$ Canada$ Scotland$ Ireland$ Faroes$ France$$ Poland$ Average$Operational$revenue$ 10$432$ 2$729$ 1$079$ 1$975$ 253$ 499$ 4$911$ 4$755$
$%$share$of$total$revenue$$ 39.17$%$ 10.25$%$ 4.05$%$ 7.42$%$ 0.95$%$ 1.87$%$ 18.44$%$ 17.85$%$
$Nominal$tax$rate5$$ 27.0$%$ 20.0$%$ 26.5$%$ 21.0$%$ 12.5$%$ 23$%$ 33$%$ 19$%$ 25.27'%'
Table 22: The weighted average of tax rates in regions where MHG is operating is 25.27% 
The other approach assumes that the income generated in the different 
regions eventually will have to be repatriated in the country of origin 
(Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 2012), hence the marginal tax rate 
should be the Norwegian marginal tax rate of 27%. However, the approach 
assumes that the tax rate in the home country is the highest of all other 
countries. Table 22 show that the tax rate in Norway is higher than all regions 
except France, were the majority of the MHG VAP market segment is based. 
Although, the tax rate in France is larger than in Norway, the tax rate in 
Poland is correspondingly smaller. Since the processing segment generates 
equivalent share of total revenue in the two countries the approach of using 
the Norwegian tax rate to estimate future cash flows is believed to provide a 
suitable rate for future estimates. 
                                            
5 Nominal tax rates are collected from KPMG 2015 (KPMG, 2015) 
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13. FINAL FUTURE ACCOUNTS AND VALUATION 
So far, a thorough strategic analysis has been conducted to determine the 
key assumptions making the basis of the cash flow used in the WACC 
method. Future harvest volumes and prices has been estimated and 
normalization has been conducted in order to retrieve the cash flows in the 
forecasting period that reflect MHG’s core operations. Further, MHG’s risk of 
financing has been estimated to compute the appropriate discount rate for 
MHG. This section presents the estimated stock price using the WACC 
method for fundamental valuation.   
  
Table 23 exhibits the assumptions for the fundamental analysis, which has 
been discusses previously. 
 
Assumptions' '' ''
Terminal$growth$
$
2.00$%$
WACC$
$
4.89$%$
Volume$CAGR$Norway$2018/19$
$
6$%$
Table 23: The different assumptions made for estimating future cash flows 
The free cash flow calculation is calculated as described in section 3. The 
output from the valuation model is presented in table 24 below, and the cash 
flow appears to be negative in the first year due to high working capital 
requirement, but is forecasted to increase thereafter at a steady growth rate.  
 
Free$cash$flow$calculation$ $$ $$ 2015$ 2016$ 2017$ 2018$ 2019$
EBIT$
$ $
$3$455$$ $3$867$$ $4$246$$ $4$725$$ $5$412$$
Tax$rate$
$ $
27$%$ 27$%$ 27$%$ 27$%$ 27$%$
EBIT$(1Mt)$
$ $
2$522$$ 2$823$$ 3$100$$ 3$449$$ 3$951$$
Plus:$Depreciation$and$amortization$
$
916$$ 827$$ 764$$ 708$$ 690$$
Less:$Capital$Expenditure$
$ $
(807)$ (869)$ (913)$ (979)$ (1$053)$
Less:$Δ$Net$working$capital$
$ $
3$008$$ 1$485$$ 1$507$$ 1$229$$ 1$319$$
Free$cash$flow$to$firm$(FCFF)$
$ $
(377)$ 1$296$$ 1$443$$ 1$949$$ 2$269$$
Table 24: The estimated cash flow show a steady increase each year 
The present value of cash flows in the forecasting period and the terminal 
value when using the WACC valuation is illustrated in figure 36, showing that 
the terminal value accounts for the majority of the enterprise value. I have 
assumed a long-term growth rate of 2.0%, which is slightly lower than the 
current inflation target in Norway. The reason for the choice of a long-term 
growth rate of 2.0% is that the inflation has been lower in recent years and is 
expected to increase in 2016, but then fall in 2017 and continue to decrease 
in 2018 (Norges Bank, 2015).  
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Figure 36: Value from the WACC method derives from the sum of the forecast period and the 
terminal value, adjusted for debt, leases and cash 
To obtain a price per share from the valuation, the net debt and present 
value of operating leases is subtracted from the enterprise value to get the 
theoretical equity value, which is then divided by the number of diluted 
shares outstanding. The result is a share price of NOK 125 for Marine 
Harvest, which is in consensus with analyst estimates. Consequently, the 
valuation suggests that MHG is slightly undervalued as it is currently trading 
at NOK 116.3. Still, the valuation is based on several assumptions, making it 
a subject to uncertainty and address the need to support the findings using 
other valuation methods in addition to the WACC method. In addition, 
sensitivity analysis should be conducted for the main drives of the enterprise 
value. 
 
Discounted$Cash$Flow$ $$ $$ 2015$ 2016$ 2017$ 2018$ 2019$
Free'cash'flow'
' $
(377)' 1'296'' 1'443'' 1'949'' 2'269''
Terminal$value$
$ $ $ $ $ $
80$113$$
Sum'of'cash'flows'
' $
(377)' 1'296'' 1'443'' 1'949'' 82'382''
Discount$factor$
$ $
0.953$$ 0.909$$ 0.867$$ 0.826$$ 0.788$$
Discounted'cash'flow'
' $
(359)' 1'178'' 1'251'' 1'610'' 64'890''
' $ $ $ $ $ $ $Enterprise'value'
'
68'570''
' $ $ $ $Less:$Debt$
$
10$669$$
$ $ $ $ $Less:$Operating$leases$
$
1$537$$
$ $ $ $ $Plus:$Excess$cash$
$
19$$
$ $ $ $ $Equity$value$
$
56$383$$
$ $ $ $ $Price'per'share'
'
125''
' $ $ $ $Table 25: Price per share is NOK 125 using the WACC method 
 
 95 
14. MARKET BASED APPROACH 
The market based approach is based on three analyses; sum of the parts 
analysis, peer analysis and precedent transactions analysis and the following 
paragraphs presents the results from the different approaches.      
 
The comparable companies used in the market based analysis is other 
Norwegian salmon farming companies; Salmar (SALM), Grieg Seafoods 
(GSF), Lerøy Seafoods (LSG) and Bakkafrost (BAKKA) respectively. These 
companies operate in the same industry and regions as MHG and the risk 
the companies face is therefore assumed to be relatively uniform. In addition, 
the peers are assumed to have quite similar growth opportunities as they are 
large enough to participate in the consolidation trend in the industry and has 
global operations like MHG. Still, the cashflows generated by the firms can 
differ at some has more processed products which implies larger sales and 
increased cost. In addition, the operational costs can differ as MHG had 
entered into feed production.  
 
14.1 SUM OF THE PARTS ANALYSIS 
The table 26 below display the results from the sum of the parts analysis. The 
valuation approach is valuable as MHG has a variety of business segments, 
both across different geographies and in various steps of the value chain. 
The analysis is based on EV/kg industry multiples retrieved from analyst 
reports of SEB and Pareto. To compute MHG’s stock price, their volumes in 
all segments are multiplied with the industry multiples to find each business 
segments contribution to the enterprise value. The enterprise value is then 
computed by adding the contributions from all business segments. Then the 
debt is subtracted and dividend added for find the market capitalization, 
which is then divided by MHG’s number of shares to find the stock price. The 
stock price using this valuation method is NOK 122, which further support the 
results found in the WACC method.    
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'' Harvest'HOG'2019E' EV/kg' MNOK' EV/EBIT'2016E' EBIT/kg' Per'share'
Farming$Norway$ 292.808$ 135.0x$ $39$529$$ 9.2x$ 14.7x$ 88$$
Farming$Chile$ 67.760$ 85.0x$ $5$760$$ 57.7x$ 1.5x$ 13$$
Farming$Canada$ 47.590$ 70.0x$ $3$331$$ 9.2x$ 7.6x$ 7$$
Farming$UK$ 63.814$ 70.0x$ $4$467$$ 8.7x$ 8.0x$ 10$$
Farming$Ireland$ 11.449$ 70.0x$ $801$$ 7.6x$ 9.2x$ 2$$
Farming$Faroes$ 9.159$ 100.0x$ $916$$ 8.9x$ 11.2x$ 2$$
Farming'Total' 492.581' 111.3x' '54'804'' 10.0x' 11.1x' 122''
' $ $ $ $ $ $Markets' 573 10.0x $5$730 $
$ $
13''
MHG'VAP' 300$ 10.0x$ $3$000$$
$ $
7''
Feed' 127$ 12.0x$ $1$524$$
$ $
3''
' $ $ $ $ $ $Ass.'Companies'
' $ $ $ $ $(48.0%$share$in$Nova$Sea)$ 40.000$ 100.0x $4$000 $ 6.9x 14.5x
$NIBD$
$ $
$307$$
$ $ $MHG's'share'
' $
'1'773''
' $
4''
' $ $ $ $ $ $Other/Group' M152 8.0x (1$216)
$ $
(3)'
' $ $ $ $ $ $Total''
' $
$65$615 $
$ $ $NIBD$
$ $
$11$507$$
$ $
26''
Dividend$addMback$
$ $
$607$$
$ $
1''
Market'Cap'
' $
'54'714''
' $ $$ $ $ $ $ $ $Number'of'shares' $450 $
$ $ $ $ $Per'share' NOK'122'
' $ $ $ $Table 26: The sum of the parts (SOTP) analysis of MHG's operations yields a share price in line 
with the WACC approach 
 
14.2 TRADING COMPARABLES  
Multiples are distinguished by trailing and prospective multiples, where 
trailing multiples use last years figures to measure the value of a company, 
while the prospective multiples use next years results in to compute the 
company value. The peer analysis is based on prospective multiples on the 
basis of the current trading multiples of the companies, retrieved from BvD 
Zephyr company database.  
 
Currently MHG is trading in the top range among its peers, which could 
support that they are slightly overvalued, but given the fact that the company 
has outperformed the market in the past, the relative analysis is supporting 
the conclusion from the WACC analysis that the company is indeed 
undervalued. The implied share price using the average trading multiples 
from the competitors is NOK 129 when using the EV/EBITDA multiple. This is 
largely driven up by Bakkafrost, trading at very high multiples, as they 
suffered from a sharp decline in earnings without the stock following the 
downturn. The EV/kg multiple however suggest that MHG is currently trading 
at a fair price. These two analyses both support a slight upside to the MHG 
stock found in the fundamental WACC analysis. 
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Company'Name' Market'Value' Enterprise'Value' EBITDA' Harvest'volume' EV/EBITDA' EV/KG'
Marine$Harvest$ $52$345$$ 63$014$$ 4$672$$ 425$$ 13.49x' 148.3x'
$ $ $ $ $ ' '
' $ $ $ $ $ $Average' 20'342'' 23'803'' 1'784'' 171'' 14.66x' 143.3x'
Median' 16'542'' 19'040'' 1'870'' 155'' 13.49x' 124.4x'
' $ $ $ $ $ $$ ' '
Grieg$Seafood$ 3$462$$ 5$180$$ 259$$ 65$$ 19.96x' 80.0x'
Lerøy$Seafood$ 17$246$$ 19$680$$ 1$870$$ 158$$ 10.52x' 124.4x'
Salmar$ 16$542$$ 19$040$$ 1$970$$ 155$$ 9.66x' 123.0x'
Bakkafrost$ 12$117$$ 12$100$$ 148$$ 50$$ 81.76x' 240.8x'
' $ $ $ $ $ $
EV'of'FY''14'
$ $ $ $ $ $Enterprise$Value$
$ $ $ $
70$394 $ 64$905 $
Less:$Debt$
$ $ $ $
10$669$$ 10$669$$
Less:$Operating$Leases$
$ $ $ $
1$537$$ 1$537$$
Plus:$Excess$cash$
$ $ $ $
19$$ 19$$
Equity$value$
$ $ $ $
58$207$$ 52$718$$
Price'per'share'
$ $ $ $
'NOK'129'' 'NOK'117''
Table 27: The price obtained in the peer analysis is slightly higher although consistent with the 
WACC and sum of the parts approach 
 
14.3 PRECEDENT TRANSACTIONS  
The deals data collected from the BvD Zephyr M&A database provides 
transaction statistics on previous acquisitions. According to Rosenbaum, 
Pearl & Parella (2013) the most relevant deals should be identified by 
considering deal value, operational similarities and what at in part of the 
cycle the respective deal was conducted. MHG is the indisputable largest 
player in the industry is trading at higher multiples than its peers and the 
deals will therefore not represent the enterprise value potentially achieved for 
MHG. One can also argue that there are operational differences between 
MHG and its peers as MHG is the only player self-sufficient in feed and has a 
higher presence in the VAP segment.  
 
Date' Acquirer' Target' Implied'EV' Tons' EBIT' EV/Kg' EV/EBIT'
14.01.2011$ Morpol$ Jøkelfjord$ $510$$ $7$$ 95.00$ 70.0x$ 5.4x$
22.10.2010$ SalMar$ Bakkafrost$ $2$272$$ $30$$ 247.00$ 75.7x$ 9.2x$
28.09.2010$ Lerøy$ Sjøtroll$ $1$298$$ $26$$ 186.73$ 49.9x$ 7.0x$
29.10.2010$ Morpol$ Lakeland$ $29$$ $0$$ n.a.$ 60.0x$ n.a.$
26.05.2010$ SalMar$ Rauma$ $416$$ $7$$ n.a.$ 60.0x$ n.a.$
29.10.2007$ Cermaq$ Arctic$Seafood$ $230$$ $4$$ n.a.$ 52.0x$ n.a.$
21.12.2006$ Cermaq$ Polarlaks$ $51$$ $3$$ n.a.$ 17.0x$ n.a.$
21.08.2006$ Lerøy$ Hydrotech$ $1$105$$ $14$$ 98.80$ 81.0x$ 11.2x$
03.12.2007$ Pan$Fish$ Fjord$Seafood$ $4$943$$ $66$$ n.a.$ 75.0x$ n.a.$
03.12.2007$ Pan$Fish$ Marine$Harvest$ $10$746$$ $283$$
$
38.0x$
$10.10.2005$ Pan$Fish$ Aqua$farms$ $285$$ $8$$
$
35.0x$
$Average' '' '' '' '' '' 55.8x' 8.2x'
Median' '' '' '' '' '' 60.0x' 8.1x'
Table 28: Relevant precedent transactions from the past decade 
Table 28 shows a range of relevant precedent transaction from the past 
decade. As previously argued, the salmon farming sector is highly cyclical, 
as shown in figure 37 on next page. The acquisitions have in general been 
completed at a price very much in line with the EV/kg multiple that MHG itself 
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has been trading on at the time. However, the sector is currently in a high 
cycle that is far above what we have seen historically, and using the deal 
multiples from precedent transactions would therefore undervalue the 
company significantly. I will therefore not emphasize this analysis when 
drawing my final conclusions.  
 
Figure 37: M&A transaction multiples on par with MHG’s trading multiples  
 
14.4 VALUATION SUMMARY 
The valuation is summarized in table 29 and figure 38. The extreme points in 
the graph in figure 38 is based on the the lowest and highest multiples from 
the market based valuation and fluctuation in the price when varying the 
price with different discounts rates and terminal growth, as I will more 
thoroughly discuss in relation to the sensitivity analyses in section 15. The 
dotted line represents the likely interval for the true price based on the 
different valuation methods, which suggest that MHG’s fundamental value 
equals NOK 125 per share. 
 
'' '' '' Enterprise'value' EV/EBITDA' Price'per'share'
Valuation'methodology' '' '' Low' Midpoint' High' Low' Midpoint' High' Low' Midpoint' High'
WACC$
$ $
73$887$ 67$052$ 79$764$ 15.4x$ 14.0x$ 16.6x$ 140$ 125' 154$
Sum$of$the$parts$
$ $
60$883$ 65$384$ 69$884$ 12.7x$ 13.6x$ 14.6x$ 112$ 122$ 132$
Trading$comparables$
$ $
50$542$ 64$771$ 70$394$ 10.5x$ 13.5x$ 14.7x$ 85$ 117$ 129$
Table 29: Summary of the valuation analyses yielding a share price around NOK 128 per share 
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Figure 38: The likely range of the stock price found in the different approaches is in the range 
between  NOK 120-130 
 
60$ 80$ 100$ 120$ 140$ 160$ 180$
FCFF
Sum$of$the$parts
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WACC method
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15. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
This chapter conducts a sensitivity analysis of the stock price retrieved to 
critical assumptions made in the fundamental analysis. I will assess how the 
stock price will vary with different levels of the major operational assumptions 
that are the largest drivers of value for MHG. Both the fundamental valuation 
and market based valuation is based on many assumptions, which make the 
results retrieved from the valuation exposed to uncertainty. It is therefore 
necessary to estimate how sensitive the estimated value is to changes in the 
main factors driving the value.  
 
In the sensitivity analyses I will first address the impact from changes in the 
salmon price and the decline in feed cost that potentially could be achieved 
through MHG’s upstream integration in feed production.  Second, I will 
address the impact on the stock price from different levels of feed cost, 
mainly driven by the commodity prices on the ingredients of fish feed, and 
the gross margin, here depicted as the feed cost’s share of the total COGS. 
Last, I will address the impact on the stock price with different levels of the 
cost of capital and the terminal growth rate. 
 
In the following I have used the current trading price of the MHG stock as a 
basis for the calculation of the impact. This is done to assess not only the risk 
from of not fully achieving the target price of NOK 125 per share, but also to 
assess the downside risk of taking a position in the stock at the current 
trading price. The bolded number in the middle of each table is referring to 
the upside if the fair value calculated in the fundamental valuation in the 
previous chapters is reached.  
  
15.1 SALMON PRICE AND REDUCTION IN FEED COST  
The sensitivity analysis in table 30 shows that the share price is highly 
sensitive to even minor changes in the salmon price. A decline of NOK 1/kg 
will lead to a loss from the current trading price at ~8%. Investing in an 
aquaculture company is a bet on the commodity price of the fish that is 
manufactured, which becomes very obvious when assessing the stock price 
effect from only marginal changes in the salmon price.  
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Further, the potential cost reduction from MHG’s upstream expansion into 
feed production could have massive impact on the stock price. As a base-
case I have assumed a decline of ~8 øre p.a. in the forecast period, which is 
a conservative assumption given the cost-plus contracts from the feed 
producers that could be cut. There is only upside from this cost cutting 
initiative, and by achieving a 12 øre reduction on the current cost per kg of 
fish feed, the stock could potentially yield a ~15% upside to the current 
trading price. 
 
$ $
Salmon'price'2015'(NOK/kg)'
Re
du
ct
io
n'
in
'fe
ed
'
co
st
'p
.a
.(N
O
K)
'
'
40.0'kr/kg' 40.5'kr/kg' 41.0'kr/kg' 41.5'kr/kg' 42.0'kr/kg'
'0.04 ' (18)$ (9)$ (0)$ 9$ 18$
'0.06'' (14)$ (5)$ 4$$ 13$ 22$
'0.08'' (9)$ 0$$ 9' 18$ 27$
'0.10'' (4)$ 5$$ 14$ 23$ 31$
'0.12'' 0$$ 9$$ 18$ 27$ 36$
Table 30: Change in stock price from current trading price with variations in salmon price and 
feed cost reductions 
15.2 COST OF GOODS SOLD 
The sensitivity analysis in table 31 shows the impact from the feed cost, and 
from which share feed cost constitute of the total COGS. This can be 
translated into what gross margin MHG can achieve. I have already 
addressed the potential gain from reducing feed cost by integrating 
upstream into feed production. Nevertheless, the largest driver of feed cost is 
the commodity prices of the ingredients of the feed. Even a slight increase in 
the feed cost will not only diminish the potential upside of the MHG stock, but 
it will lead to a direct loss over the current trading price. The feed cost is 
estimated to account ~60% of MHG’s total COGS, and will have a dramatic 
impact on earnings if it changes.  
 
Further, I have addressed the assumption that feed account for 60% of 
COGS. If the other direct costs per kg salmon harvested would be higher the 
gross margin would decline. There would still be an upside to the MHG stock 
if the feed/COGS declined by 1%, but further declines would reduce the 
stock price from the current trading levels. 
$ $
Feed'cost'
Fe
ed
'co
st
'o
f'
'to
ta
l'C
O
GS
' '' 11.50'kr/kg' 11.75'kr/kg' 12.00'kr/kg' 12.25'kr/kg' 12.50'kr/kg'
59.0'%' 24$ 12$ (1)$ (13)$ (25)$
59.5'%' 29$ 16$ 4$ (8)$ (20)$
60.0'%' 33$ 21$ 9' (3)$ (15)$
60.5'%' 38$ 26$ 14$ 2$$ (10)$
61.0'%' 42$ 30$ 18$ 6$ (6)$
Table 31: Change in stock price from current trading price with variations in feed cost and the 
feed cost's share of total COGS 
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The largest risk associated with the COGS is an increase in the feed cost, but 
MHG’s recent upstream expansion has to some extend mitigated this risk, as 
they are more in control of their own feed supply, and could better hedge the 
price risk in the commodity market. 
 
15.3 LONG-TERM GROWTH AND COST OF CAPITAL 
Last, a sensitivity analysis is conducted for the long-term growth and cost of 
capital (WACC), exhibited in table 32. The results show that the long-term 
growth is the single most important factor driving the stock price. An 
estimated long-term growth of 2% is a quite conservative growth rate, given 
the potential for salmon as an ever more important source of protein in the 
future. Using a low long-term growth rate will limit the potential downside of 
an incorrect estimate. As we see from table 32, a decline of 0.2% from the 
assumed long-term growth would still yield positive returns on the stock from 
current price, while an increase of 0.2% would yield an upside of ~17%.  
 
The WACC is currently at a historical low level, as the interest rates has been 
dropping since the financial crisis, and a recovery is not expected in the near 
future. Both the cost of debt and the CAPM through the risk-free rate will be 
driven largely by the interest rate level, so large deviations from the 
calculated WACC of 4.9% is of low probability. However, we see that if the 
WACC should increase by only 0.25% there would be negative returns from 
the current trading price.  
 
$ $
WACC'
'
$M$$$$ 4.4$%$ 4.6$%$ 4.9$%$ 5.1$%$ 5.4$%$
Te
rm
in
al
'
Gr
ow
th
'R
at
e' 1.8$%$ 29$$ 13$$ (0)$ (12)$ (21)$
1.9$%$ 35$$ 18$$ 4$$ (8)$ (18)$
2.0$%$ 43$$ 24$$ 9$' (4)$ (15)$
2.1$%$ 50$$ 30$$ 14$$ 0$$ (11)$
2.2$%$ 59$$ 37$$ 20$$ 5$$ (7)$
Table 32: Change in stock price from current trading price with variations in WACC and terminal 
growth rate 
 
Concluding the sensitivity analyses above, I assess the risk from changes in 
the main value drivers to be high, but the assumptions I have made are quite 
conservative, potentially leaving a substantial upside, in line with analyst 
consensus who communicate target prices between NOK 120-140. 
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16. CONCLUSION  
In this thesis I have studied and estimated the fair value of MHG’s share 
price. I have mainly used the WACC approach to calculate the equity value 
of MHG. Other valuation approaches have been conducted to support the 
fundamental analysis, namely multiple-based relative valuation and sum-of-
the-parts analysis. To support the assumptions required in the valuation 
analysis, I have conducted analyses on macroeconomic and industry- 
specific factors affecting the salmon farming industry. Further I have 
assessed firm-specific factors to determine MHG’s competitive position, and 
ultimately their ability to generate cashflow that will make the foundation in a 
fundamental analysis. 
 
“In 2013 we chose “Leading the Blue Revolution” as our vision. Our ambition 
is to become a world-leading, integrated provider of seafood protein” 
Alf-Helge Aarskog CEO of MHG 
 
In the macroeconomic analysis, I find that the economic conditions for MHG 
are favorable for several reasons. First, GDP per capita in the main markets 
for salmon are increasing and that increased spending power triggers a 
greater desire to purchase healthier and more environmentally friendly foods. 
Salmon is associated with high nutritional value and environmentally friendly, 
which supports greater demand. Second, the Norwegian currency has been 
weakened largely compared to the currencies of several of our largest trade 
partners the past year. The low exchange rate is expected to persist for 
some time, and this is favorable for the export of Norwegian salmon and 
beneficial for MHG as the majority of their harvested volume is in Norway. 
However, there are other factors that are inhibiting growth. The governmental 
license scheme in Norway and the continuous problem with salmon lice and 
diseases in several of the regions where MHG operates threatens the organic 
growth in the industry. The growth of MHG is therefore highly dependent on 
the consolidation opportunities, and the benefit from R&D activities aimed to 
fix the fish health issues, such as sea lice other deceases, that are causing 
high mortality rates and decrease in quality of the fish.  
 
Further, the rivalry in the industry is considered as relatively high as salmon 
and commodities used in feed production is to a large determined by 
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demand as being fresh goods with short shelf life and long production 
cycles. The salmon price is also considerably higher than the price of other 
animalistic protein, as the consumers is typically price sensitive with regards 
to food. This implies a major disadvantage for salmon. The current prices can 
however become more favorable if the challenges with health issues are 
resolved, as the quality improves and the mortality rates declines.  
 
MHG’s increased focus on the VAP market could also be favorable as the 
products generally enjoy higher margins and MHG’s exposure to the volatile 
salmon price is reduced, as it become more diversified. In addition, MHG is 
seeking to become entirely integrated in the value chain from fertilized egg 
production to sales and distribution. They are currently present in every 
process in the value chain, except of the fertilized egg production – the 
ambitions are however to become self-sufficient in egg supply in the future. 
The ambition to become a fully integrated company will reduce the risk 
associated with the biological assets and allow MHG to optimize the input in 
feed production, which consequently can improve the profitability margins by 
reducing the operational cost.       
  
Overall, the future prospects are favorable for MHG and the financial markets 
do not seem to fully appreciate this in the current pricing of the stock. I have 
chosen to focus largely on the WACC approach that yields a target share 
price of NOK 125, which is a ~8% premium over the current share price. The 
estimate is based on several assumptions, but I have chosen to take a 
conservative approach to the estimates, reducing the downside risk from my 
valuation. Sensitivity analysis on the key value drivers show that there are 
considerable variations in the share price with changes key input, especially 
the long-term growth, as ~95% of the company’s enterprise value derives 
from the terminal value. To support the target price from the WACC analysis, 
I have also conducted a relative valuation based on the trading multiples of 
several of the closest competitors. I find that the price from my WACC 
analysis is directionally right, even though the price suggested is slightly 
lower than the target price of NOK 125 per share. My assessment is that 
MHG is trading on a market leader premium, and that MHG is trading on the 
high-end of the multiples is justified. Therefore, I uphold my target price of 
125. Lastly, the SOTP analysis yields a share price of NOK 122 that reinforce 
my belief that the MHG stock is trading at a discount to its fair value, and that 
a buy recommendation is appropriate.  
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APPENDIX  
 
A.1 DATA 
The financial information of MHG given in the thesis used adjusted 
statements in the financial report for all years. The data collected for the 
precedent transactions and trading peers was downloaded from DataMonitor 
and the BvD Zephyr M&A database, which is available for all students at the 
Norwegian School of Economics.   
 
 A.2 SYNTHETIC RATING APPROACH BY DAMODARAN  
If'interest'coverage'ratio'is'greater'than' ≤'to' Rating' Spread' '' ''
12,50$ M$ Aaa/AAA$ 0,40$%$
$
$$
9,50$ 12,50$ Aa2/AA$ 0,70$%$
$
$$
7,50$ 9,50$ A1/A+$ 0,85$%$
$
$$
6,00$ 7,50$ A2/A$ 1,00$%$
$
$$
4,50$ 6,00$ A3/AM$ 1,30$%$
$
$$
4,00$ 4,50$ Baa2/BBB$ 2,00$%$
$
$$
3,50$ 4,00$ Ba1/BB+$ 3,00$%$
$
$$
3,00$ 3,50$ Ba2/BB$ 4,00$%$
$
$$
2,50$ 3,00$ B1/B+$ 5,50$%$
$
$$
2,00$ 2,50$ B2/B$ 6,50$%$
$
$$
1,50$ 2,00$ B3/BM$ 7,25$%$
$
$$
1,00$ 1,50$ Caa/CCC$ 8,75$%$
$
$$
0,80$ 1,25$ Ca2/CC$ 9,50$%$
$
$$
0,50$ 0,80$ C2/C$ 10,50$%$
$
$$
M$ 0,50$ D2/D$ 12,00$%$ $$ $$
 
 111 
A.3 FORECASTED INCOME STATEMENT 
Income$statement$FY'$ended$in$January$ 2015E$ 2016E$ 2017E$ 2018E$ 2019E$
Revenue$and$other$income$ 26'723' 28'773' 30'245' 32'439' 34'877'
Cost$of$Materials$ 15'188' 16'355' 17'179' 18'446' 19'864'
Gross'Profit' 11'536' 12'253' 12'883' 13'788' 15'013'
Fair$value$uplift$on$harvested$fish$ 0' 0' 0' 0' 0'
Fair$value$adjustment$on$biological$assets$ 0$ 0$ 0$ 0$ 0$
Salary$and$personnel$expenses$$ 3$907$ 4$207$ 4$422$ 4$743$ 5$099$
Other$operating$expenses$$ 3$149$ 3$244$ 3$343$ 3$503$ 3$702$
EBITDA' 4'480' 4'803' 5'119' 5'542' 6'211'
Depreciation$and$amortization$ 916$ 827$ 764$ 708$ 690$
Restructuring$costs$ 109$ 109$ 109$ 109$ 109$
EBIT' 3'455' 3'867' 4'246' 4'725' 5'412'
Interest$$cost$ 807$ 807$ 810$ 952$ 1$124$
Profit'on'ordinary'activities'before'taxation' 2'573' 2'877' 3'182' 3'366' 3'696'
Taxation$ 840$ 939$ 1$039$ 1$099$ 1$207$
Net'earnings'from'continuing'operations' 1'733' 1'938' 2'143' 2'267' 2'489'
 
